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PREFACE 
 
Unlike many fields of research, race and ethnic politics is one in which researchers 
usually have some sort of personal connection. For me, incidentally, comparative politics is one 
of those fields too. 
I had the opportunity to spend two months of this research project in New Zealand, my 
home country. On the eve of my return to the United States, I experienced a verbal and physical 
racial attack in public. The incident was scarring, but the timing was potent.  
This thesis project is the culmination of years of personal rumination on the 
complications caused by minority racial identities in the struggle for national belonging. It was 
not until I left my native New Zealand that I realized racial exclusivity was not universal. Living 
in New Zealand, the United States, and (temporarily) the United Kingdom has channeled my 
struggles into a belief that solutions lie in comparison and emulation. 
A 24-hour flight separates my two worlds; so, too, do my experiences as a racial 
minority. After the incident that occurred at home, this project seemed more important than ever. 
The burden has always been on minorities to keep the faith in a nation which oftentimes 
disservices them. Through comparison and emulation of the most inclusive parts of each country, 
perhaps this burden will eventually cease to exist. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Past literature has established that often in a white-majority society, a national label is associated 
with the white population more than people of other ethnic origins. Canada, the United States, 
Australia, and New Zealand share many historical and institutional similarities, making them 
valuable comparative cases. While scholars have researched national identity to varying degrees 
in these countries, the gap remains in comparative analysis of perceptions of national identity. 
This thesis first analyzes comparative public opinion data to establish differences in the degree to 
which national identity is racially-exclusive in the case countries. Second, it compares historical 
immigration policy, multiculturalism policy and programs, and ethnic activism in each country to 
understand what causes varying levels of racialization. The data analysis finds ‘American’ to be 
the most racially-inclusive national identity and ‘Australian’ to be the least. The thesis also finds 
that presence of ethnic activism (or lack thereof) can best explain the variation between the four 
countries, while the institutional variables were inconsistent with the variation. These results 
contribute to understandings of the drivers of national identity construction and lend support to 
arguments in the wider public opinion literature that social movements are more influential for 
opinion formation than legislation. The surprising result that multiculturalism policy was not 
mapped with more inclusive national identities also provides policymakers with insight on the 
effectiveness of different policy pathways to promote inclusion. Additionally, given the 
extensive negative consequences of exclusion documented in psychology literature and for civic 
engagement, the results of this thesis illuminate pathways towards more inclusive societies. 
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 1 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The question of ethnicity is addressed in a peculiar manner on the New Zealand census. If 
one were white, one would tick “New Zealand European.” However, if one were Asian, or 
Pacific Islander, one would tick “Chinese,” “Samoan,” or another nationality-based descriptor.1 
“Chinese” and “Samoan” are not preceded by the “New Zealand” qualifier like “European” is, 
causing Kiwis of Chinese and Samoan descent to erase their New Zealand identity in a way 
white New Zealanders are not forced to do. 
Subtle and everyday occurrences of exclusion insidiously remind minorities that they do 
not quite belong in white-majority societies, which accept those of European ancestry as the 
‘default,’ the ‘baseline,’ and the ‘local.’ Often reminded that they are considered foreign in their 
own land, racial minorities confront constant perceptions that they may not really be from their 
hometowns, instead hailing from countries to which they may have never even been. 
Like New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and the United States also have large numbers of 
racial minorities within a white-majority population. The four countries are bound by common 
values, institutions, and settler-colonial histories. But belonging to these places is a different 
story, with disparities across the four countries, and being perceived to belong is yet more 
complex and varied. What makes someone appear Canadian or Australian? How does one feel 
American? Who is seen to belong in New Zealand? And how does racial identity complicate the 
messy struggles for inclusion in these immigrant-receiving nations? Despite their similarities, 
 
1 The ethnic categories on the 2018 New Zealand census were, from top to bottom: New Zealand European, Māori, 
Samoan, Cook Islands Maori, Tongan, Niuean, Chinese, Indian, other. See: 
https://www.stats.govt.nz/assets/Reports/2018-census-design-of-forms/2018-Census-Design-of-forms.pdf 
 2 
these countries draw different boundaries of belonging in their willingness to afford their 
national label to non-white members of their community. 
This thesis compares the degree to which public conceptions of national identity are 
racially-exclusive in Canada, Australia, the United States, and New Zealand — in other words, 
the extent to which the public views being [Canadian, Australian, etc.] as equal to being white — 
and seeks to explain what causes varying levels of racialization between the countries’ national 
identities by comparing institutional and behavioral explanations. 
This project makes three key contributions. First, it contributes to understandings of the 
complex and varied role race can play in conceptions of national identity, introducing the idea 
that ostensibly similar settler societies can differ on their relative inclusion of minorities. 
Scholars have explored national identity in each of the four case countries to varying degrees, 
theoretically and through empirical public opinion analysis. However, one fundamentally 
missing piece in the existing literature is robust comparative analysis of national identity 
perceptions in each country. Second, this thesis finds drivers of change in national identity 
perceptions to make an argument that conceptions of national identity are malleable, not fixed. 
Again, it uses comparative analysis, combining data and history, to understand the pathways that 
lead to national identity construction, finding that particular social interventions have historically 
been able to re-shape national identity. Third, although the thesis focuses on the drivers of 
national identity, it also contributes to the wider public opinion literature through its 
methodology. Scholars have extensively explored the nature of changes in public opinion on a 
wide variety of issue areas, comparing the influence of a range of factors.2 This thesis asks 
whether institutions or social movements can change public opinion more effectively — or at all.  
 
2 For example, the case of LGBT rights presents a particularly interesting area of research for scholars. While public 
opinion is typically stable over time, support for same-sex marriage increased from 35% to 61% between 2006 and 
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The contribution of this project is also reflected through its implications. As globalization 
continues, the population of minorities who struggle with inclusion in racially heterogeneous 
societies will only rise. Negative psychological detriments have been documented extensively in 
literature for these populations, which lead to societal disparities. Crucially, subtle exclusionary 
behaviors such as microaggressions constitute a new ‘invisible’ racism, whose insidiousness can 
be more damaging than overt forms of racial prejudice. Additionally, exclusion can lead to 
decreased patriotism and civic engagement among minorities, leading to a weaker sense of 
nationhood at large. Comparative research is extremely helpful in better understanding how to 
improve inclusion efforts in these countries. Without comparative analyses on policy and public 
opinion trends, countries may unnecessarily endeavor to reinvent the wheel. Countries can learn 
from one another. For example, if non-white immigrants experience more inclusion in one 
country than another, it is beneficial to investigate the causes of this, which may be of interest to 
both policymakers and social activists. 
 
Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand 
Consistent with intuition, research has shown that settler societies (like the United States) 
have been more in favor of immigrant adoption of mainstream identities and have offered easier 
access to citizenship than non-settler societies (like France), which have been less accepting or 
even acknowledging of alternative identities.3 This has been well researched, but less explored is 
why settler societies themselves might differ in their relative acceptance of racial minorities. 
 
2016. Harrison and Michelson explored the reasons for this transformation. See: Brian F. Harrison and Melissa R. 
Michelson, Listen, We Need to Talk: How to Change Attitudes about LGBT Rights (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2017). 
3 Jeffrey G. Reitz, “Towards Empirical Comparison of Immigrant Integration across Nations,” Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 39, no. 13 (October 20, 2016): 2338–45, https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2016.1203448 reviews Richard 
Alba and Nancy Foner’s book “Strangers No More: Immigration and the Challenges of Integration in North 
America and Western Europe.” 
 4 
Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand share many similarities, making 
them valuable comparative cases to tease out causes of differences in their inclusion of their non-
European citizens. Of particular importance is their shared demographic history of an indigenous 
population, British settler-colonization, and significant non-white immigration. In addition, other 
factors, such as their broadly similar institutions and socioeconomic development facilitate 
robust comparative analysis. The first important similarity across the four cases is the presence 
of an indigenous population. Canada’s indigenous population comprises First Nations, Inuit, and 
Métis peoples; Australia’s includes Aboriginal Australians and Torres Straight Islanders; New 
Zealand has its indigenous Māori population, and the United States’ indigenous population is 
made up of Native Americans. Second, each country was colonized by British settlers and 
became part of the British Empire, which instituted a dominant Anglo-Saxon, English-speaking 
culture that underlay institutions and societal structures. Third, each country is a significant 
immigrant-receiving nation. While there were extensive immigration restrictions in place across 
the cases, policy liberalization in each country led to high levels of non-white immigration in the 
second half of the twentieth century. The United States population is 61% non-Hispanic white,4 
Canada is 81% white (19% identify as ‘visible minorities,’)5 and 76% of New Zealanders are of 
European ancestry.6 Australia’s census does not collect information on race and ethnicity, but the 
Australian Human Rights Commission estimated the white population to be 76%,7 similar to that 
in New Zealand. 
 
4 According to 2018 population estimates, United States Census Bureau. 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045218 
5 According to 2011 National Household Survey, Statistics Canada. https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/as-
sa/99-010-x/99-010-x2011001-eng.cfm#a3 
6 According to 2013 Census, Statistics New Zealand. 
https://www.stats.govt.nz/infographics/major-ethnic-groups-in-new-zealand 
7 Australian Human Rights Commission, Leading for Change: A Blueprint for Cultural Diversity and Inclusive 
Leadership Revisited., 2016, 7. 
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Although the term ‘white’ has historically been contended in race literature and across 
societies, for the purposes of this thesis, the conception of white refers to populations of 
European descent. This thesis takes a more societal-focused approach and classifies those 
perceived to be of exclusively European ancestry as white, and those perceived to be of any other 
ancestry as non-white. This largely fits with Statistics Canada’s definition of ‘visible minority.’8 
In addition to broad resemblances in their demographic histories, there are other 
similarities that make the four case countries useful for comparison. Notably, each ranks within 
the top 15 most developed countries in the world, according to the United Nations’ Human 
Development Index, which assesses development through education, life expectancy, and gross 
national income.9 The four countries also share other societal similarities — they are all 
representative democracies, follow the common law legal system, and have market economic 
systems. 
Furthermore, there is already extensive scholarship comparing these four countries on 
social issues and governance. Scholars have compared Canada, the United States, Australia and 
New Zealand on monetary policy,10 health outcomes among indigenous populations,11 and 
immigration policy,12 among other areas, indicating that their broad similarities allow for useful 
comparisons highlighting diverging policy pathways and social change. 
 
8 Statistics Canada defines “visible minorities” as ‘persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in 
race or non-white in colour.’ See: Statistics Canada Government of Canada, “Visible Minority of Person,” Statistics 
Canada, December 2, 2015, https://www23.statcan.gc.ca/imdb/p3Var.pl?Function=DEC&Id=45152. 
9 United Nations Development Program, “Human Development Report 2019,” 2019, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/statistical-data-tables-7-15. 
10 Sean Collins and Pierre L. Siklos, “Optimal Monetary Policy Rules and Inflation Targets: Are Australia, Canada, 
and New Zealand Different from the U.S.?,” Open Economies Review 15, no. 4 (October 1, 2004): 347–62, 
https://doi.org/10.1023/B:OPEN.0000048523.79011.b2. 
11 Anton Clifford et al., “Interventions to Improve Cultural Competency in Health Care for Indigenous Peoples of 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the USA: A Systematic Review,” International Journal for Quality in Health 
Care 27, no. 2 (April 1, 2015): 89–98, https://doi.org/10.1093/intqhc/mzv010. 
12 See, for example: Ather H. Akbari and Martha MacDonald, “Immigration Policy in Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and the United States: An Overview of Recent Trends,” International Migration Review 48, no. 3 (2014): 
801–22; Kirsten Lovelock, “Intercountry Adoption as a Migratory Practice: A Comparative Analysis of Intercountry 
 6 
 
Research Design and Organization 
This thesis follows a two-part investigation that first, establishes differences between the 
countries’ public attitudes, and then second, explains this variation. The first part analyzes survey 
data from the International Social Survey Programme and domestic surveys to establish that 
there are in fact differences in national identity across the four cases, and posits a hierarchy of 
most to least racialized national identities. This ranking is represented in a proposed Scale of 
National Ethnocentrism. The second part turns to a qualitative study of comparative history to 
explain the rankings of this Scale. The three possible explanatory variables analyzed are 
ethnicity-based immigration policy, institutional multiculturalism, and ethnic activism. These 
three variables allow for an institutional versus behavioral comparison, contributing to one of the 
thesis’ underlying questions of whether institutions or behavior drives national identity 
construction. It is likely that a vast array of independent variables work together to explain 
differences in national identity perception, and a multitude of variables have been found to 
influence national identity construction, including economic development13 and immigrant 
growth.14 However, the goal of this thesis is not to cover every possible cause of national identity 
construction. Instead, the three variables explored — immigration policy, federal policies 
promoting multiculturalism, and ethnic activism and movements — are three areas where, 
 
Adoption and Immigration Policy and Practice in the United States, Canada and New Zealand in the Post W.W. II 
Period,” International Migration Review 34, no. 3 (September 1, 2000): 907–49, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/019791830003400310; Patrick Ongley and David Pearson, “Post-1945 International 
Migration: New Zealand, Australia and Canada Compared,” International Migration Review 29, no. 3 (September 1, 
1995): 765–93, https://doi.org/10.1177/019791839502900308. 
13 F.L. Jones and Philip Smith, “Individual and Societal Bases of National Identity. A Comparative Multi-Level 
Analysis,” European Sociological Review 17, no. 2 (June 1, 2001): 103–18, https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/17.2.103. 
14 Matthew Wright, “Diversity and the Imagined Community: Immigrant Diversity and Conceptions of National 
Identity: Diversity and the Imagined Community,” Political Psychology 32, no. 5 (October 2011): 837–62, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2011.00843.x. 
 7 
despite their many commonalities in other realms, Canada, Australia, the United States, and New 
Zealand differ meaningfully; analyzing these potential sources of variation in public opinion is 
likelier to yield some explanatory leverage on the differences highlighted in public opinion 
across the four countries. As exemplified in Fig. 1, the theory of this thesis argues that each of 
these independent variables may act through specific mechanisms which lead to opinion change 
on national identity. Immigration policy is likely to cause demographic shifts which can lead to 
changing perceptions of the boundaries of the national community. Multiculturalism policy is 
likely to create systemic inclusiveness which can foster inclusiveness among the public. Ethnic 
activism is likely to garner public attention and recognition for minorities’ experiences which 
can sway public opinion on minorities’ place within the nation. 
 
Figure 1. Potential sources of varying national identity construction 
 
 
 
This thesis is organized in the following manner: Chapter two explores existing public 
opinion literature on the racialization of national identity in each of the case countries 
individually. It also outlines existing comparative studies on public perceptions of national 
Immigration policy Institutional multiculturalism Ethnic activism 
Opinion change 
Demographic 
shifts 
Systemic 
inclusiveness 
Public 
recognition 
 
 
Institutional variables 
Behavioral variable 
Independent 
variables: 
Mechanisms 
of change: 
Dependent 
variable: 
Source: Compiled by author. 
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identity, including scholarship that explores the causes of variation in national identity 
construction. Chapter three analyzes survey data and its results position the United States as the 
least racialized national identity, followed by Canada, New Zealand, and Australia as the most 
racially-exclusive national identity. Chapters four to six are each devoted to one of the three 
independent variables: ethnicity-based immigration policy, institutional multiculturalism, and 
ethnic activism to explain why the United States has the most ‘color-blind’ national identity and 
Australia the least. Chapter seven moves to a discussion on which of the variables best helps 
explain the ranking found in chapter three’s Scale of National Ethnocentrism. To preview its 
conclusions, this thesis finds that ethnic activism is the most powerful driver of national identity 
construction — countries that experienced more ethnic activism have less racialized national 
identities, whereas countries that lacked minority protest have more racially-exclusive identities. 
The institutional variables examined here did not prove to be credible predictors of racialization 
of national identity. Immigration policy was broadly similar among the countries, and any 
specific differences across the four cases were inconsistent with their placement on the Scale of 
Ethnocentrism. Multiculturalism policies across the four countries were clearly different, but the 
ranking of policy liberalism placed Canada and Australia at the top, incompatible with their 
rankings on the Scale of Ethnocentrism. This counterintuitive result lends support to the 
argument that bottom-up approaches are more effective than top-down approaches in changing 
public opinion. The thesis concludes with the implications of this research, as well as future 
avenues of investigation. Ultimately, this thesis uses comparative analysis to determine why 
similar groups of people experience different levels of inclusion in ostensibly similar societies 
and seeks to contribute to broader understandings on public opinion shifts over time. 
 
  
 9 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
What characteristics, beliefs, or even behaviors define a nation and its people? Literature 
on nationalism and national identity is vast, spanning across time, place, and fields of research. 
This project, however, focuses on the racial dimensions of national identity construction in 
public opinion. While researchers in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States have 
thoroughly explored many dimensions of belonging, they have explored less which racial groups 
are seen as more genuine members of the national group. 
This literature review first examines existing public opinion studies in each of the 
countries individually, finding a range of research with differing emphases. The most relevant 
literature to this thesis focuses specifically on the association of race with nationality, but this 
approach has only been pursued in the United States and New Zealand. Hence, this chapter 
reviews two other main topics to supplement these studies: literature comparing civic and 
ascriptive notions of national identity (explained below) and research on attitudes towards 
immigrants of varying ethnic origin. 
Second, this chapter looks at existing comparative public opinion literature on national 
identity. Like the second part of this thesis, existing comparative literature seeks to explain 
differences in how national identity is perceived across countries, taking into account societal 
factors such as economic development. However, there are no studies comparing the four case 
countries, and the types of variables explored are not comprehensive. 
A framework frequently used in national identity literature, the civic versus ascriptive 
divide refers to two differing conceptions of what people perceive to constitute national identity. 
The more ascriptive, immigrant-excluding definition of national identity emphasizes factors such 
 10 
as ancestry and nativity. For example, an ascriptive view of ‘Britishness’ would indicate a 
homogenous view of Brits who reflect a certain physical image or history. For the purposes of 
this thesis, when a national identity is found to be more ‘ascriptive,’ it is likely to be more 
ethnocentric and racialized. Second, a more voluntaristic, civic, or achievable definition of 
national identity includes factors such as respect for institutions and “feeling” like a national.15 
Under this view, one is fully British if one respects the country’s institutions and feels British, 
regardless of one’s race or culture. For the purposes of this thesis, when a national identity is 
found to be more ‘civic,’ it is likely to be less ethnocentric and racialized. This framework is 
found in each of the countries’ national identity literatures as well as the comparative studies. 
 
United States of America 
It is no overstatement to say that national identity in the United States has been greatly 
studied. The literature exploring nativist versus civic conceptions of identity is vast, both in the 
form of theory and data analysis. Fitting within literatures as distinct as psychology 
(investigating how people group themselves) and political science (exploring American 
nationalism and patriotism), analysis on what being American means is more abundant than 
present studies in the other three case countries. 
The United States has long been described by political theorists as both an ethnic and 
civic nation,16 and polling has tapped at what Americans make of the divide. More relevant to the 
present investigation, one study has been foundational in explicitly testing the association of 
different racial groups with the American label. The first study to ask “who’s American” and 
 
15 For the “achievable” factor definition, see: Wright, 838. 
16 Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Who Counts as an American?: The Boundaries of National Identity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511750717. 
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place racial prejudice at the core of national identity,17 Devos and Banaji’s (2005) seminal 
‘American = White?’ study showed that while Americans outwardly committed to egalitarian 
principles, African and Asian Americans were consistently implicitly less associated with the 
‘American’ label than white Americans.18 In addition, even Asian Americans themselves 
subscribed to the American = White effect, while African Americans did not.19 This supports 
Kim’s (1999) widely-cited work on racial triangulation, arguing that Asian Americans are 
perceived to be more foreign than white or black Americans.20 Prior to Devos and Banaji’s 
study, Citrin et al.’s (1990) study established the existence of the nativist sentiment that a strong 
majority of Americans thought that speaking English was very important in making a ‘true 
American.’21 While there have been no studies that have directly replicated the ‘American = 
White?’ study in the United States, results from other polling and studies are consistent with 
Devos and Banaji’s findings. For example, Citrin et al.’s (1994) analysis revealed that Americans 
routinely favor European immigrants over those from Latin America, Asia, or Africa.22 Ostfeld 
(2015) found that race of immigrants did not affect attitudes towards immigration policy, but that 
white Americans showed greater opposition to immigrants with “dark skin tones and 
stereotypically Afrocentric features” in close social contexts.23 Closely related to opinions on 
which racial groups belong in the United States, negative attitudes towards immigrants based on 
 
17 Thierry Devos and Mahzarin R. Banaji, “American = White?,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 88, 
no. 3 (2005): 448, https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.88.3.447. 
18 Devos and Banaji, “American = White?” 
19 Devos and Banaji. 
20 Claire Jean Kim, “The Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans,” Politics & Society 27, no. 1 (March 1, 1999): 
105–38, https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329299027001005. 
21 Jack Citrin, Beth Reingold, and Donald P. Green, “American Identity and the Politics of Ethnic Change,” The 
Journal of Politics 52, no. 4 (November 1990): 1130, https://doi.org/10.2307/2131685. 
22 For analysis of the 1991 California Poll and 1992 Gallup Poll, see Jack Citrin et al., “Is American Nationalism 
Changing? Implications for Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 1 (March 1994): 16, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2600870. 
23 Mara Ostfeld, “The Backyard Politics of Attitudes Toward Immigration,” Political Psychology 38, no. 1 
(February 1, 2017): 21–37, https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12314. 
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culture have also been documented extensively in American literature: in the studies of Burns 
and Gimpel (2000),24 Chandler and Tsai (2001),25 Brader et al. (2008),26 Valentino et al. 
(2012),27 and Mangum (2019).28 
Literature on the civic versus ascriptive divide has also been vast. Summarizing this 
literature, Schildkraut’s (2014) review argues that there is wide agreement among social groups 
that civic components are more important than ascriptive ones in American national identity, 
although some sects of the population endorse ascriptive views. Additionally, there is some 
indication that external factors can influence national identity over time — literature found an 
increase in ascriptive ideas after 9/11.29 
National identity public opinion literature in the United States has also focused on 
different racial groups’ self-evaluation of Americanness. In the 1990s, public opinion polling 
analysis showed that black, white, and Hispanic Americans all report a strong sense of closeness 
to the United States.30 However, more recent literature demonstrates varying results. Black 
Americans were less likely than whites to identify with the American label, but Hispanics and 
 
24 Peter Burns and James G. Gimpel, “Economic Insecurity, Prejudicial Stereotypes, and Public Opinion on 
Immigration Policy,” Political Science Quarterly 115, no. 2 (2000): 201–25, https://doi.org/10.2307/2657900. 
25 Charles R. Chandler and Yung-mei Tsai, “Social Factors Influencing Immigration Attitudes: An Analysis of Data 
from the General Social Survey,” The Social Science Journal 38, no. 2 (June 1, 2001): 177–88, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0362-3319(01)00106-9. 
26 Ted Brader, Nicholas A. Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay, “What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? 
Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat,” American Journal of Political Science 52, no. 4 (2008): 959–78, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00353.x. 
27 Nicholas A. Valentino, Ted Brader, and Ashley E. Jardina, “Immigration Opposition Among U.S. Whites: 
General Ethnocentrism or Media Priming of Attitudes About Latinos?,” Political Psychology 34, no. 2 (2013): 149–
66, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2012.00928.x. 
28 Maruice Mangum, “Revisiting Economic Threat and Cultural Concerns: Public Opinion toward Immigration and 
Non-Citizens by Race,” Social Science Research 83 (September 1, 2019): 102309, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2019.05.002. 
29 Deborah J. Schildkraut, “Boundaries of American Identity: Evolving Understandings of ‘Us,’” Annual Review of 
Political Science 17, no. 1 (May 11, 2014): 441–60, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-080812-144642. 
30 1996 General Social Survey and 1994 Los Angeles County Social Survey results in Jack Citrin, Cara Wong, and 
Brian Duff, “The Meaning of American National Identity: Patterns of Ethnic Conflict and Consensus.,” in Social 
Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Reduction., Rutgers Series on Self and Social Identity; Vol. 3. (New 
York,  NY,  US: Oxford University Press, 2001), 71–100. 
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other people of color reported the same level of closeness as whites.31 Blacks were also less 
likely than whites to consider themselves as “typical Americans,”32 or set hard boundaries — 
such as speaking English and being born in the United States — against being an American.33 
Notably, Asians, Native Americans, and Hispanics were as likely as whites to consider 
themselves as typical Americans.34 Another study found that black Americans felt American but 
thought they were not perceived as such by white Americans. Cuban Americans did not feel 
American or think they were perceived as such, although length of residency increased feelings 
of inclusion.35 
It is evident that the United States holds a somewhat exclusionary national identity with 
an association of whiteness, in both the ‘American = White?’ study and attitudes on immigration. 
However, civic notions of national identity are widely accepted, and results have also pointed to 
variation among racial groups in their self-evaluations of feeling American — it appears that 
some minority groups consider themselves fully American even if implicit attitudes point to 
whiteness as more commonly associated with the country.  
 
New Zealand 
Public opinion studies in New Zealand have investigated the relationship between ethnic 
origin and conceptions of national identity, although this has tended to focus on the Pakeha 
(white) population and Māori, rather than non-indigenous racial minorities. The literature has 
 
31 Analysis of the Public Perceptions of the American People 2002 survey in Theiss-Morse, Who Counts as an 
American?, 49. 
32 Theiss-Morse, 83. 
33 Theiss-Morse, 91. 
34 Theiss-Morse, 83. 
35 Kelly M. Barlow, Donald M. Taylor, and Wallace E. Lambert, “Ethnicity in America and Feeling ‘American,’” 
The Journal of Psychology 134, no. 6 (November 2000): 581–600, https://doi.org/10.1080/00223980009598238. 
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also found mixed opinions — New Zealanders appear to generally commit to civic notions of 
national identity but also hold a racial bias against non-white immigration. 
Of immense relevance to the present investigation, Sibley and Liu (2007) replicated 
Devos and Banaji’s (2005) ‘American = White?’ study in New Zealand, finding that among 
Pakeha participants, Pakeha and Māori images were associated with being a New Zealander, but 
Asian images were not.36 They also found ingroup favoritism among Māori and Asian New 
Zealanders: each saw themselves more implicitly associated with New Zealand symbols than the 
other group, although Māori showed much stronger levels of ingroup favoritism than Asians. 
Although this study could have contributed to the literature of national identity perceptions of 
immigrants and all racial minorities, it focused on explaining the result that Pakeha saw Māori as 
equally associated with New Zealand as themselves, as opposed to exploring why Asians were 
not seen in the same way. 
There has only been one study that has focused on the ascriptive versus civic divide in 
New Zealand. Humpage and Greaves’ (2017) study found wide support for civic components of 
national identity, indicating a generally inclusive identity, although certain ascriptive factors, 
especially speaking English, were considered important.37 They also used individual-level 
characteristics to explain variation. New Zealanders who lean politically right, vote New Zealand 
First,38 or have lower levels of education were more likely to relate to ascriptive views, whereas 
being female and Māori increased the likelihood of prescribing civic notions of being a New 
Zealander.39 
 
36 Chris G. Sibley and James H. Liu, “New Zealand = Bicultural? Implicit and Explicit Associations between 
Ethnicity and Nationhood in the New Zealand Context,” European Journal of Social Psychology 37, no. 6 
(November 2007): 1222–43, https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.459. 
37 Louise Humpage and Lara Greaves, “‘Truly Being a New Zealander’: Ascriptive versus Civic Views of National 
Identity,” Political Science 69, no. 3 (September 2, 2017): 247–63, https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2017.1418177. 
38 New Zealand’s third largest political party in Parliament, advocating for nationalist ideals. 
39 Humpage and Greaves, “‘Truly Being a New Zealander.’” 
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Ward and Masgoret’s (2008) study found that New Zealanders strongly endorsed 
multiculturalism and viewed immigrants more favorably than EU citizens did, but less so than 
Canadians.40 An explanation of the difference between New Zealand and Canada pointed to 
Canada’s federal multiculturalism policy, in place since 1971 (and explored in chapter five). 
New Zealanders were also more likely than Australians to agree that society should be made up 
of different races, and favored integration rather than assimilation for acculturation. However, 
their affinity for immigrants depended on cultural distance and region of origin of the 
immigrants, with a hierarchy prioritizing Australian, British, and South African immigrants.41 
 
Canada 
While Canadian scholars have thoroughly explored national identity and race, analyses 
using public opinion have been more modest. Additionally, researchers have paid attention to 
immigrants’ and minorities’ own conceptions of ‘Canadianness.’  
Like in New Zealand, there is limited Canadian scholarship on the ascriptive versus civic 
divide in national identity perceptions. Raney’s (2009) analysis showed that there is a strong 
national identity rooted in civic components.42 However, it also showed that public opinion is 
changing, with an increase in cultural nationalism between 1995 to 2004 (Canadians began to 
prioritize the importance of factors such as speaking English and being native-born), and a 
decrease in support for civic notions like respect for institutions. This increase was partially 
explained through ingroup survival responses to increased immigration and terrorist events in 
 
40 Colleen Ward and Anne-Marie Masgoret, “Attitudes toward Immigrants, Immigration, and Multiculturalism in 
New Zealand: A Social Psychological Analysis <sup/>,” International Migration Review 42, no. 1 (March 2008): 
227–48, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2007.00119.x. 
41 Ward and Masgoret. 
42 Tracey Raney, “As Canadian as Possible … Under What Circumstances? Public Opinion on National Identity in 
Canada Outside Quebec,” Journal of Canadian Studies 43, no. 3 (August 2009): 5–29, 
https://doi.org/10.3138/jcs.43.3.5. 
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North America,43 indicating a malleable construction of national identity that can change with 
events. 
Literature on public attitudes towards immigrants of varying national groups is also very 
limited in Canada. However, one study finds that native-born white Canadians have grown 
increasingly accepting of immigration and racial diversity over time.44 
Importantly, Canadian literature includes the opinions of immigrants themselves. The 
strongest variable leading immigrants to feel Canadian is time spent in their host country.45 In 
addition to self-prescribed feelings of belonging, to immigrants, being Canadian also involves 
supporting multiculturalism and a society that supports cultural and civic freedoms.46 In addition 
to quantitative data analyses, qualitative interviews also detail minorities’ perspectives on how 
they are perceived. In Mahtani’s (2002) investigation of the place of mixed-race identities within 
Canada’s nationhood, mixed-race interviewees said that “authentic” Canadians were of British or 
French blood and that they continued to be positioned as outsiders.47 
 
Australia 
Whether one must be white in order to be seen as Australian has not been sufficiently 
explored through public opinion research. However, while national identity perceptions have not 
 
43 Raney, 21. 
44 Antoine Bilodeau, Luc Turgeon, and Ekrem Karakoç, “Small Worlds of Diversity: Views toward Immigration and 
Racial Minorities in Canadian Provinces,” Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science 
Politique 45, no. 3 (2012): 579–605. 
45 David Walters, Kelli Phythian, and Paul Anisef, “The Acculturation of Canadian Immigrants: Determinants of 
Ethnic Identification with the Host Society*,” Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue Canadienne de Sociologie 44, 
no. 1 (July 14, 2008): 37–64, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-618X.2007.tb01147.x. 
46 Peter R. Grant, “‘Canadian, Eh?’ An Examination of the Multidimensional Structure and Functions of the 
National Identity of Immigrants and of Those Raised in Canada,” Canadian Ethnic Studies Journal 48, no. 1 (2016): 
45+. 
47 Minelle Mahtani, “Interrogating the Hyphen-Nation: Canadian Multicultural Policy and ‘Mixed Race’ Identities,” 
Social Identities 8, no. 1 (March 2002): 77, https://doi.org/10.1080/13504630220132026. 
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been comprehensively scrutinized, researchers have paid great attention to attitudes towards 
immigration in Australia. 
Like in Canada and New Zealand, Australian research on civic versus ascriptive or 
ethnocultural views of national identity is sparse. McAllister’s (2016) study found that civic and 
ethnocultural views were both present in the Australian population, but ethnocultural views were 
far stronger in influencing attitudes on immigration, indicating only “partial progress [of the 
government’s multiculturalism policies] in generating a strong sense of civic identity within the 
Australian population.”48 One national identity study found that a majority of Australians believe 
it is important to have been born in Australia to be “truly Australian.”49 Being able to speak 
English, an ethnocultural factor, is seen as more important, while feeling Australian, a civic 
component, is even more significant.50 
Attitudes on immigration have been studied extensively in Australia, and while they do 
not directly translate into national identity perceptions, they reveal general attitudes towards the 
inclusion of racial minorities in Australia. Scholars have studied broad opinions on immigration 
levels,51 but more relevant to the present investigation is attitudes on immigrants by region. Data 
tables from Betts’ (2005) analysis of the 2001 Australian Election Survey (AES), show that a 
majority of Australians wanted less immigrants from the Middle East, over a third wanted less 
immigrants from Asia, and only 13.9% wanted less British immigrants.52 This result is supported 
by an earlier aggregate analysis of polls from 1984 to 1990 finding a majority opposition to 
 
48 Ian McAllister, “National Identity and Attitudes towards Immigration in Australia,” National Identities 20, no. 2 
(March 15, 2018): 157–73, https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2016.1206069. 
49 F.L. Jones, “Ethnic Diversity and National Identity,” The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology 33, 
no. 3 (December 1997): 289, https://doi.org/10.1177/144078339703300302. 
50 Jones, 289. 
51 See, for example: Katharine Betts, “Cosmopolitans and Patriots: Australia’s Cultural Divide and Attitudes to 
Immigration,” People and Place 13, no. 2 (June 2005): 29+. 
52 Katharine Betts, “Migrants’ Attitudes to Immigration in Australia: 1990 to 2004,” People and Place 13, no. 3 
(September 2005): 27. 
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Asian immigration.53 Immigrants themselves also had racial biases: British-born immigrants 
were more likely to want an increase in immigration from their own group than Asian 
immigrants.54 Bilodeau and Fadol’s (2009) analysis showed that negative attitudes towards 
immigration in Australia are linked to a historical legacy of governmental distrust in its Asian 
neighbors.55 Other literature has identified new conservative movements that believe Asian 
immigration to be a threat to white Australians.56 
An abundance of immigration literature points to a general attitude that favors white 
immigrants over non-white, but the gap in research remains in exploring how willing Australians 
are to call non-white members of their community “Australian” once they have reached and 
settled in the country. 
 
Comparative Public Opinion Studies 
Studies directly using public opinion data or experiments to compare conceptions of 
national identity (such as Devos and Banaji’s ‘American = White?’ piece) across countries 
remain limited. However, a few studies have sought to explain why variation in belonging does 
exist across countries, which is the subject of chapters four to seven of this thesis. This literature 
has focused on national identity as either more ascriptive or more civic. 
 
53 Murray Goot, “PUBLIC OPINION AS PARADOX: AUSTRALIAN ATTITUDES TO THE RATE OF 
IMMIGRATION AND THE RATE OF ASIAN IMMIGRATION, 1984–1990,” International Journal of Public 
Opinion Research 3, no. 3 (1991): 287, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/3.3.277. 
54 Betts, “Migrants’ Attitudes to Immigration in Australia: 1990 to 2004.” 
55 Antoine Bilodeau and Nada Fadol, “The Roots of Contemporary Attitudes toward Immigration in Australia: 
Contextual and Individual-Level InfluencesÞ,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 34, no. 6 (June 1, 2011): 1088–1109, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2010.550630. 
56 Winnifred R. Louis et al., “Speaking Out on Immigration Policy in Australia: Identity Threat and the Interplay of 
Own Opinion and Public Opinion: Speaking Out on Immigration,” Journal of Social Issues 66, no. 4 (December 
2010): 653–72, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.2010.01669.x. 
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Explanatory variables for the variation have also fallen along two lines: macro-societal 
forces (which influence a whole society’s attitudes) and individual-level characteristics (which 
influence one person’s attitudes) that contribute to opinion formation. For example, a prominent 
macro-societal influence on national identity perceptions is economic development. 
Industrialization, and thus the growth of the economy, has been found to lead to a stronger 
embrace of civic notions of national identity.57 Lazic and Pesic’s (2016) study compared factors 
that led to ascriptive or civic perceptions of national identity in 17 European nations. They 
explored the effect of historical legacies (democratic traditions, dominant religious 
denomination, and ethnic composition), structural characteristics (GDP per capita, level of 
urbanization, migration rate, and tertiary education attainment rate), and individual 
characteristics (gender, age, and university education) and found that GDP per capita was most 
strongly positively correlated with the spread of civic notions of national identity. However, 
economic development only increased civic components of national identity up to a certain level 
of development, after which it had no influence. Additionally, the researchers found that civic 
and ascriptive notions did not have an oppositional relationship: while economic modernization 
increased the importance of civic components of national identity, people did not reject 
ascriptive notions to the same degree, attesting to the multifaceted nature of national identity.58 
Although in past literature GDP per capita appears to correlate with changes in national 
identity, it is an imperfect explanation of national identity construction. First, GDP per capita, 
and economic development in general, hides many lurking variables that could instead explain 
how national identity changes, for example, liberalization of policies from governments on the 
 
57 Jones and Smith, “Individual and Societal Bases of National Identity. A Comparative Multi-Level Analysis.” 
58 Mladen Lazic and Jelena Pesic, “Components of National Identities - a Comparative Sociological Analysis,” 
Corvinus 7, no. 1 (2016): 27–49, https://doi.org/10.14267/163. 
 20 
issue of ethnic diversity as governmental resources increase, or increased societal activism in 
promoting social issues. Additionally, economic development would not be an appropriate 
method of comparison for every country — Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and the United 
States are developmentally similar, so this would not explain variation in national identity 
perceptions.  
Another societal force found in the literature is immigration proliferation. Wright’s 
(2011) longitudinal analysis found a trend among participant countries in the International Social 
Survey Programme (ISSP) that immigrant growth was associated with a more exclusive 
definition of who belongs, with economic prosperity of countries having minimal significance.59 
Canada deviated from the trend and displayed higher levels of ascriptive nationalism than 
expected based on its high immigrant growth, while Britain and Sweden showed less ingroup 
exclusivity than their immigrant growth might predict. As Canada, the United States, Australia, 
and New Zealand’s history of immigration expansion is similar, this relationship is also unlikely 
to hold true for the case countries. 
Although this thesis focuses on macro-societal forces, individual-level factors can also 
give insight into the drivers of national identity construction. Jones and Smith’s (2001) multi-
factor analysis compared macro-social and individual explanations, and found influence of 
both.60 The strongest individual-level differentiators of holding voluntaristic (as opposed to 
ascriptive) views were social class (education and income) and immigrant status. It also found 
that both ascriptive and civic constructs of national identity were simultaneously present in 
 
59 Wright, “Diversity and the Imagined Community.” 
60 Jones and Smith, “Individual and Societal Bases of National Identity. A Comparative Multi-Level Analysis.” 
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individuals’ minds. In Europe, individual education was also connected with the incidence of 
ascriptive constructs of national identity.61 
 
Evaluation of Existing Literature 
Based on the literature on national identity perceptions in each of the four countries, it is 
near impossible to propose a robust ranking of the countries’ relative racialization of their 
national labels because of the inconsistencies in the volume of literature on each topic. 
Table 1. Comparison of literature in each country, by topic 
 
 Racialization of 
national 
identity studies 
Civic versus 
ascriptive national 
identity studies 
Attitudes towards 
immigrants by ethnic origin 
Findings from other 
studies 
United 
States 
‘American = 
White?’ study 
shows 
racialization 
Abundant literature: 
civic attitudes 
dominant 
Abundant literature: bias 
against non-white immigrants 
 
Minorities feel 
belonging 
New 
Zealand 
‘New Zealand = 
Bicultural?’ 
study shows 
racialization 
Limited literature: 
civic attitudes 
dominant 
Limited literature: bias 
against non-white immigrants 
Less support for 
multiculturalism than 
Canada, more than 
Australia 
Canada None Limited literature: 
civic attitudes 
dominant 
Limited literature: acceptance 
of non-white immigrants 
Minorities feel 
belonging 
 
Australia None Limited literature: 
ethnocultural 
attitudes dominant 
Abundant literature: bias 
against non-white immigrants 
 
 
 
The United States has by far the greatest amount of literature on all aspects of ethnicity 
within national identity. Although the United States literature demonstrated the dominance of the 
white identity, civic notions of national identity were generally stronger than ascriptive, and 
other immigrant-based groups may see themselves as equally American. New Zealand revealed 
similar attitudes overall, with a clear bicultural national identity prioritizing white and Māori 
New Zealanders, excluding other racial groups. However, the literature in New Zealand has been 
quite limited. The same is true in Canada, where there is no direct experiment testing the 
 
61 Lazic and Pesic, “Components of National Identities - a Comparative Sociological Analysis.” 
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association of race with national identity. Its lack of literature overall creates an unclear picture, 
although the limited literature reveals that Canada does appear to be slightly more accepting of 
non-whites than the other countries. Lastly, Australia appears to be the least accepting — 
researchers found strong ascriptive notions of national identity as well as an abundance of 
evidence of hierarchies favoring immigrants with origins in white, Anglo-Saxon native countries. 
However, there is a clear gap in the national identity literature on public opinion on the 
Australian label. Without harmonized data among the four countries, a definitive ranking cannot 
be suggested. Thus, the focus of chapter three is to analyze comparative data in order to create an 
accurate comparison of the three countries’ relative racialization of national identities. 
The comparative literature aimed at explaining variation in national identity construction 
focuses on macro-societal factors that can contribute to opinion formation, which is the target of 
this thesis, but it has three clear gaps. First, the research focuses on factors such as economic 
development and immigrant growth, which leaves in question the effects of institutional 
variables such as multiculturalism policy, or behavioral factors such as movements. Second, one 
use of comparative analysis is that it provides opportunities for countries to emulate successes. 
While the literature presents correlations among variables, it does not adequately explain why 
these exist. Current comparative studies that empirically analyze public opinion data tend not to 
qualitatively analyze historical pathways or policy developments that cause the observed results. 
On the other hand, theoretical national identity pieces do not incorporate concrete public opinion 
data. The gap in the literature remains in the marriage of empirical results with analysis of causal 
pathways, rooted in history. Third, there are no studies comparing the national identities of the 
four case countries discussed here.  
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This thesis fills the gap in the comparative literature by first, analyzing the variation 
between the four case countries using a harmonized dataset and second, explaining the variation 
using previously unexplored institutional and behavioral explanatory factors that represent 
potential historical pathways to opinion formation.  
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CHAPTER THREE: OBSERVED VARIATION IN NATIONAL IDENTITY 
CONSTRUCTION 
 
 
While research in Canada, Australia, the United States, and New Zealand has to some 
degree explored the racialization of national identity, this has not been harmonized and compared 
among the four countries. Differences between conceptions of each national identity may exist. 
This chapter uses survey data to investigate and present differences between how each country 
draws its borders of inclusion towards non-indigenous racial minorities. These differences set the 
foundation for the next three chapters, which investigate variables that may explain discrepancies 
in public opinion between each country. 
 
Data and Methods 
The primary data source used for the comparative analysis presented here is the 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP).62 
The module used in the present analysis is national identity, which asks questions on 
national consciousness and identity. Respondents are aged 18 years and over. There have been 
three iterations of this module: 1995, 2003, and 2013. As the 2013 national identity survey was 
only fielded in the United States, the 2003 ISSP is used as it is the most recent survey which 
includes all four case countries. 
 
62 Founded in 1984 by Australia, Great Britain, Germany and the United States, the ISSP is a cross-national 
collaboration that conducts annual surveys on social science topics. There are currently 42 member countries, 
including the four case countries studied here. Each nation is represented by an institutional member — an academic 
organization, university or survey agency. There are currently 11 modules of topics, for example, role of 
government, social inequality and environment. Each year focuses on one of these modules, with multiple iterations 
of each completed since 1984; See: ISSP Research Group, “International Social Survey Programme: National 
Identity II - ISSP 2003,” GESIS Data Archive, Cologne, 2012, ZA3910 Data file Version 2.1.0. doi:10.4232/1.11449 
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 This investigation uses four clusters of survey variables (seven questions) to establish 
variation in national identity racialization among the case countries: 
1. Civic National Identity Construction Questions: How important do you think each of 
the following is for being truly [NATIONALITY]? 
 
a. To have [COUNTRY] citizenship 
b. To have lived in [COUNTRY] for most of one's life 
c. To have been born in [COUNTRY] 
d. To have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] ancestry 
 
2. It is impossible for people who do not share [COUNTRY's] customs and traditions to 
become fully [COUNTRY'S NATIONALITY]. 
 
3. Some people say that it is better for a country if different racial and ethnic groups 
maintain their distinct customs and traditions. Others say that it is better if these 
groups adapt and blend into the larger society. Which of these views comes closer to 
your own? 
 
4. How close do you feel to [COUNTRY]? 
 
 
This thesis uses these variables to construct an image of national belonging and to 
diagnose how each country draws its boundaries of belonging, focusing on whether the 
boundaries are racialized. Although this investigation centers around the role of race in national 
identity, one limitation of survey research is that many potentially useful questions cannot be 
accurately answered because of social desirability bias. There is no comparative survey which 
directly asks respondents which race belongs more within the nation. Hence, the collection of 
variables analyzed is designed to tease out nuances of national belonging despite the limitations 
in data. The first question targets civic devotion aspects of national identity. Questions 2-4 target 
ethnocentric notions of national identity. Comparing how each country responds to the civic 
versus ethnic questions can provide insight on the degree to which racial minorities are accepted 
into the national ingroup. 
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A race indicator variable is created in order to cross-tabulate and compare the responses 
between whites and non-whites. This variable is split into two groups: the white plus indigenous 
population and the non-white, non-indigenous population. As Australia’s dataset does not ask for 
respondents’ racial groups, the race indicator variable was constructed using the variable asking 
for their most spoken language at home, with a non-European language speaker coded as a non-
white, non-indigenous respondent. No respondents reported speaking an indigenous language. 
Undoubtedly, this is an imperfect construction of one’s race, as many racial minorities may 
speak mostly English at home, so there may be an overrepresentation of minorities in the white 
category. However, this design is used to prevent exclusion of Australia from many of the 
analyses that center around comparing white responses to those from minorities. This limitation 
is accounted for in the results, although the Australian results do in fact follow the trends set by 
the other countries, despite the flawed race construction variable. On future reference for these 
analyses, “whites” refers to the white plus indigenous population while “non-whites” points to 
the non-white, non-indigenous population. 
As a minor supplement to these data, the New Zealand General Social Survey (2008, 
2010, 2012) is also used to further illustrate New Zealand’s public opinion on belonging. 
Most of the analyses were conducted using weighted proportion tables, comparing 
responses from each country directly. In addition, to strengthen the validity of comparisons, 
weighted t-tests were used to test the statistical significance of differences between countries.63 
 
 
63 Each country’s ISSP data follows a different weighting scheme. The American and Canadian datasets come with 
pre-prepared weights based on demographic factors as well as survey research adjustments. New Zealand’s data 
remains unweighted as the weighted data shows only minor adjustments in estimates. For the present investigation, 
weights were constructed for the Australian dataset based on gender, education, and age targets from the 2001 
Census. 
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Results 
1. Civic National Identity Construction Variables:  
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Figs. 2-5 display the cross-national differences in perceptions of what is considered 
important to be “truly” part of a nationality. These variables focus on civic devotion and 
sustained contact with the nation, as opposed to ethnocentric views on nationality.  
Over 80% of Americans and 74% of Canadians regard citizenship as very important, 
whereas only 57% of Australians agree, a statistically significant difference between all three 
countries. Only 4% of Americans and 6% of Canadians think it is not important to be citizens in 
order to be truly American or Canadian. New Zealand’s distribution is statistically distinct from 
its North American counterparts’, but not Australia’s. 
Question 1b paints a similar picture: Where almost 60% of Americans think it is very 
important to have lived in the country for most of one’s life, only 35% of Australians think the 
same. Thirty-two percent of Australians think it is not important to have lived in the country for 
most of one’s life to be considered truly Australian, while only 18% of Americans reject this 
requirement. Canadians and New Zealanders lie between these two contrasts and remain 
statistically distinct from the other two, with Canada holding views more similar to Australia, 
and New Zealanders leaning towards Americans. 
Australia and the United States again take contrasting approaches on the issue of whether 
it is important to have been born in the country to truly be a member of its national community. 
New Zealand and the United States are almost equal in their opinions: a strong majority (77%) of 
each nation believe it is very or fairly important to be have been born in the country and only 
23% believe one can truly be a New Zealander or American without having been born there. 
There is no statistically significant difference between the opinions of the two countries. 
Australia is much more split — 59% of Australians think birth place is important, and over 41% 
believe it is not, a statistically significant difference from New Zealand and the United States (p 
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< 0.00001). Canada’s 69%/31% split lies between the two extremes, different from each to a 
statistically significant degree. Australia and the United States also clearly contrast on the 
extremes of opinion: well over half (55%) of Americans believe birth to be very important, while 
only a third (33%) of Australians agree. 
The survey question on the importance of ancestry in determining one’s national identity 
can be interpreted in many ways, so the reliability of this variable is somewhat limited. However, 
it is understood here to mean the importance of multiple generations of settlement. Following a 
pattern well established over the last three variables, Australians are the least likely to think that 
ancestry is important; only 38% think it is important while a strong majority of 62% regard it as 
unimportant. New Zealanders lie on the other extreme — a majority (60%) believe it is important 
to have New Zealand ancestry, while 40% believe it is not. Americans and Canadians are more 
split on the issue, although Canadians are the least likely to think that it is very important to have 
ancestry. All countries are statistically distinct on the issue. 
Among these civic descriptors of national identity, Americans value living in the United 
States, having U.S. citizenship, and being born in the country more than any of the other 
countries. It clearly values a civic devotion to the nation. Consistently on the other side of the 
spectrum, Australians do not believe that these factors are very important, and are the least likely 
to place importance on any of the four variables. Most of the variables show statistically 
significant differences between the countries, but Australians and Americans stand on opposite 
ends to a statistically significant degree on all four questions. New Zealanders and Canadians fall 
in the middle — New Zealanders place importance on having multiple generations of ancestry 
and being born in the country, and are not as concerned about citizenship as North Americans. 
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Canadians value citizenship almost as much as Americans, but are unlikely to value ancestry as 
highly. 
 
2. It is impossible for people who do not share [COUNTRY's] customs and 
traditions to become fully [COUNTRY'S NATIONALITY]. 
 
3. Some people say that it is better for a country if different racial and ethnic 
groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions. Others say that it is better 
if these groups adapt and blend into the larger society. Which of these views 
comes closer to your own? 
 
 
The previous results on civic devotion are illuminated by the variables highlighting an 
ethnic-conscious approach to national identity. Question 2 asks how much respondents agree 
with the statement that it is impossible for people who do not share a country’s customs and 
traditions to fully share the country’s nationality. This question acts as a proxy to indicate a 
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country’s tolerance for multiculturalism, and by extension, people from ethnically distant 
backgrounds. Again, there is a contrast between Australia and the United States. This time, 
however, 43% of Australians agree that it is impossible for those who do not share Australian 
customs to become fully Australian, while 32% of U.S. respondents agree, a statistically 
significant difference (p < 0.00001). More people in each country disagree with the statement 
than agree, except for in Australia. Canada and New Zealand did not differ to a statistically 
significant degree with around 37% agreeing with the statement, showing less inclination 
towards multiculturalism than the United States but more than Australia. Canadians were, 
however, the most likely to strongly agree out of the four countries that sharing customs and 
traditions is important to being fully Canadian.  
Question 3 presents the most curious case of variation.  
The question allows respondents to choose from two options:  
1. It is better for society if groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions. 
2. It is better if groups adapt and blend into the larger society. 
There is extraordinary variation across the four countries in this case. Americans are 
evenly split — almost half (48%) think that it is better if groups maintain their distinct customs, 
while the other half (52%) prefers assimilation and blending. In the other three cases, clear 
majorities favor assimilation instead of maintaining distinct cultures, including 65% of 
Canadians over two-thirds (69%) of New Zealanders. Australia presents an even more striking 
contrast to the United States: a strong majority of 82% of Australians agree that it is better for 
groups to adapt, while less than a fifth (18.2%) think that groups should remain distinct, which 
almost half of Americans prefer. Here, each country is distinct from one another to a statistically 
significant degree, except for New Zealand and Canada.  
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Isolating each country’s (non-indigenous) racial minorities’ answers on the question and 
comparing them with the whole population’s opinions reveals many useful truths. First and most 
superficially, it reveals the discrepancy between the dominating societal attitude (mainly dictated 
by the white population) and any dissenting minority populations’ opinions. Perhaps more 
crucially, incongruency between the two can reveal discord between the white and non-white 
populations, indicating a population that shows less understanding towards the minority or 
immigrant experience, or even dissatisfaction towards minority presence from the majority 
population. 
Fig. 8 reveals that the strongest incongruency exists among Canadians, with a 17 
percentage point swing in favor of maintaining traditions when only minorities are asked. In 
Australia, there is a 12 percentage point difference, but even among minorities, only 30% believe 
that it is better to maintain distinct traditions rather than assimilate, still less than white and non-
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white Canadians combined. New Zealand also has a difference of 8 percentage points between 
minorities and the general population. It is the United States’ result, however, that is the most 
noteworthy. The opinions of racial minorities do not differ from the general population at all — 
American whites and non-whites are congruent with each other, indicating that general public 
opinion effectively reflects the minority experience. The other countries’ — especially Canada’s 
— discrepancies between minority and majority opinions indicate less societal understanding of 
the immigrant experience than Americans show. 
 
4. How close do you feel to [COUNTRY]? 
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Although the variable ‘How close do you feel to your country’ has its limitations for this 
particular study, some insight can be gained from comparing responses of non-indigenous 
minorities with responses of the white and indigenous populations. 
The first comparison is the overall minority “closeness” levels between each country. 
New Zealand and Australia lead the cases with 96% and 93% of racial minorities respectively 
feeling close or very close to their countries. Meanwhile, 87% of Canadian minorities feel close 
or very close, and the United States trails the group with 78% feeling the same. Forty-five 
percent of New Zealand and Canadian minorities feel very close and only 37% of Australians 
feel the same, but this is not a statistically significant difference (p = 0.3). However, American 
minorities are the least likely to feel this way, at 32%. 
The second — and more relevant — comparison looks at the difference between white 
and minority responses in each country. Canada has the closest mapping between its white plus 
indigenous population and its non-white population. New Zealand, Australia and the United 
States all have substantial differences between how close whites and non-whites feel towards 
their countries. While 63% of white and Māori New Zealanders feel very close to their country, 
only 45% of non-whites do, an 18 percentage point difference. Australia’s white and non-white 
populations see a 15 percentage point difference, while the United States has the most 
pronounced difference at 56% of whites feeling very close and 32% of non-whites feeling the 
same, a 24 percentage point difference. 
The United States displays the lowest level of affinity among minorities towards their 
country. However, as national circumstances can vary aggregate results, the more important 
finding is the dissonance between white and non-white responses. There is a great discrepancy 
between responses from the white population and minorities in Australia, New Zealand and the 
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United States, with Canada being the only country with almost perfect congruency among its 
people of different racial backgrounds. 
While these results offer some insight into the overall congruency of majority and 
minority feelings towards the nation, they must be taken with their limitations. First, the 
construction of the race variable for the Australian data itself is the first (and previously 
explained) limitation. The potential overrepresentation of minorities in the white sample may 
lead to false similarities between white and minority opinion. However, a 15 percentage point 
difference was still found in how close each group felt to Australia. This limitation indicates that 
the true difference between the white and minority “closeness” levels may be even greater than 
15 percentage points, which would match results from New Zealand and the United States. 
Second, the question asks respondents about “how close” they feel towards their country, rather 
than explicitly about belonging or inclusion. There could be a multitude of reasons why one 
might feel close (or not) to one’s country that are unrelated to inclusion, including political 
climate, geographical affinity, and other personal reasons, which could affect whites and non-
whites differently. Ultimately, this question is mainly useful in providing insight on the 
discrepancy between whites and non-whites in the feelings they have towards their country. 
Other domestic datasets can be used to supplement the ISSP. Specifically, the New 
Zealand General Social Survey (GSS) asks respondents about the strength of their belonging to 
New Zealand.64 
 
 
64 Statistics New Zealand, “New Zealand General Social Survey: 2008”;  Statistics New Zealand, “New Zealand 
General Social Survey: 2010”;  Statistics New Zealand, “New Zealand General Social Survey: 2012.” 
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These results substantiate the finding from the ISSP data showing that New Zealanders 
tend to place importance on being born in the country and having New Zealand ancestry. Across 
all three years, less than one tenth of New Zealanders of European descent felt that they did not 
belong, whereas up to 29% of Asians felt this way in 2010. Over half of white New Zealanders 
felt that they very strongly belonged in all three years, while only a fifth to a quarter of Asians 
felt this way across the survey years. New Zealanders of Pacific Island descent displayed higher 
levels of belonging than Asians, but not as high as Europeans. Māori consistently displayed the 
highest level of belonging, with over two-thirds claiming a very strong belonging to the country. 
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The other countries’ General Social Surveys do not ask this useful question, but the NZ 
GSS provides a useful substantiation of the finding that belonging within the New Zealand 
national community tends to depend on race and ancestry. 
 
Discussion 
According to these results, a ‘Scale of National Ethnocentrism’ can be created from a set 
of criteria, ranking the countries by the extent to which race determines inclusion in their 
national labels. 
Table 2. Rankings of countries by factors valued in public national identity construction 
 
 Civic devotion 
important [in public 
opinion] 
Multiculturalism/diversity 
valued [in public opinion] 
Majority-minority 
opinion congruency 
United States ü(1) ü(1) ü(1) 
Canada û(3) ü(2) û(2) 
New Zealand û(2) ü(3) û(3) 
Australia û(4) û(4) û(4) 
ü = yes, û = no, (1) = ranking [1 = less racialized, 4 = more racialized] 
 
Figure 11. Scale of National Ethnocentrism 
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The three main criteria in the Scale of National Ethnocentrism, derived from the analyzed 
survey data, are the value of civic devotion (such as citizenship) in public opinion, the value of 
multiculturalism (as opposed to assimilation) in public opinion, and whether societal public 
opinion matches attitudes of minorities. When the four countries are assessed on these three main 
dimensions, a distinct hierarchy shows the United States as the most ‘color-blind’ in extending 
people its ‘American’ label and Australia as the least. 
United States: Leading the other countries in racial inclusivity, the United States is the 
most likely to believe in the importance of being born in the country and having lived there for 
most of one’s life as important factors of being American. It also values citizenship. However, it 
is the only country without a majority favoring assimilation over multiculturalism. It has the 
greatest proportion of people who believe in maintaining distinct ethnic traditions (rather than 
assimilation), and the least likely to believe that to be truly American, one must share American 
customs and traditions. Lastly, the general population’s opinions towards multiculturalism 
conform with those of racial minorities, suggesting a high level of harmony between minority 
preferences and those of the majority. Previous literature both contrasts and complements this 
analysis. Although Devos and Banaji (2005) found that the American label is associated with 
whiteness, they also found that some American minorities felt that they were fully American 
despite the implicit testing.65 Additionally, the present analyses are consistent with previous 
research finding widespread support for civic constructions of American national identity. The 
results from this analysis do not argue that the American national identity is fully racially 
inclusive — it simply highlights that it may be more so than the other three countries. 
Additionally, it is important to address the fact that as the United States is a large and very 
 
65 Devos and Banaji, “American = White?” 
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heterogenous country, there is likely to be inter-state variation in perceptions of what it means to 
be ‘American.’ However, these geographical differences can be likened to any other 
demographic differences within any country that are associated with differences in opinion. This 
thesis aims to capture the aggregate American opinion and compare it with the aggregate 
opinions of the three other case countries. 
Canada: The standout civic variable that Canadians deem as important is citizenship. 
Other than the legal declaration that one is Canadian, civic devotion is not important. Canadians 
also show less of a preference for multiculturalism than the United States, leaning more towards 
assimilation — a somewhat surprising result, considering Canada’s multiculturalism policies 
(explored in chapter five). Canada also displays the highest level of incongruency between 
majority and minority opinion on the topic of assimilation, displaying a strong dissonance 
between groups. However, Canadian non-whites feel equally as close to their country as the 
white and indigenous population, suggesting that there may be a specific ‘Canadian’ culture to 
which every citizen can relate, regardless of race, which is consistent with previous studies 
finding a high level of belonging among immigrants themselves. Canada’s results, however, also 
challenge existing literature which has found more acceptance of civic aspects of national 
identity. Ultimately, these analyses fill a crucial gap in Canada’s existing national identity 
literature. 
New Zealand: With a national identity more racialized than Canada’s, New Zealand also 
only places importance on a couple of aspects of civic devotion. Being born in New Zealand and 
having ancestry is highly important to being a true New Zealander, but citizenship is not. This 
finding conforms to New Zealand’s comparative preference for assimilation and homogeneity 
rather than a mix of traditions, customs, and cultures. In addition, there is a moderate level of 
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dissonance between minority attitudes on multiculturalism and that of the whole population. The 
GSS also displays dramatically lower levels of belonging felt by immigrant-based racial minority 
groups. This analysis also conforms to existing literature finding that immigrant groups are less 
associated with the New Zealand label.66 However, like in Canada, it negates research that finds 
that New Zealanders embrace civic notions of national identity. 
Australia: Diametrically opposed to the United States, Australians are the least likely to 
think that any of the civic variables (citizenship, sustained contact, etc.) are important to be truly 
Australian. However, they are the most likely to agree that one cannot become fully Australian 
without sharing their customs and traditions, and they are the biggest proponents of assimilation 
and blending. Additionally, Australian non-whites are more likely than the general public to 
favor multiculturalism in their national community, revealing dissonance among groups. 
Interestingly, minorities in Australia are more likely than even whites in each other country to 
call for assimilation, reflecting a pervasive ethno-cultural approach to being Australian. On all of 
the variables linking culture and nationality, Australians showed the most ethnocentric attitude, 
indicating a clear and distinct racialization of national identity. This is consistent with existing 
literature finding strong bias against non-white immigrants in Australia as well as presence of 
ethnocultural conceptions of national identity. 
The overall distribution of results show that to be American is to civically commit to the 
country through either generations of presence, many years of residency, or actual citizenship. 
As long as one is a U.S. citizen, it is still ‘American’ to preserve one’s ethnic traditions. To be 
Australian (and to a slightly lesser extent, New Zealander and Canadian) is to commit to the 
culture, to assimilate, and to integrate ethnically, as nationality is viewed more as one dominant 
 
66 Sibley and Liu, “New Zealand = Bicultural?” 
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ethnic or cultural group. Overall, these results are consistent with some previous findings, but not 
all. However, the areas of inconsistency are where the literature is previously lacking, so these 
results do not negate well-established findings in research. 
Although these data point more to cultural aspects of nationality than racial, these 
findings still strongly indicate a racialized nationality. This is because having one dominant 
cultural group makes it easier for people of the dominant phenotype (European descent) to claim 
the culture and be accepted as part of the ingroup. Hence, those that are not part of the majority 
racial group may be perceived to not be part of the main cultural group, either. Under these 
conditions, racial minorities are therefore more likely to be labeled as foreign, rather than 
national insiders who simply have a different culture. 
These results point to the objective of this investigation: what explains the variation in 
these countries of what it means to belong? Why are boundaries of belonging drawn along racial 
lines for Australia more than for the United States? The following chapters are dedicated to the 
second part of this investigation: explaining the variation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: ETHNICITY-BASED IMMIGRATION POLICY 
 
 
Immigration regulation is one of the most important tools for a nation to control who can 
and cannot enter the country. In each of the four case countries, immigration policy has 
historically been used to exclude people based on race, ethnicity, and national origin. 
Conceptions of national identity can shape immigration policy, but crucially, with such control 
over inflows of different ethnic groups, immigration policy may in turn shape conceptions of 
national identity through curating the ethnic demographics of the country. This chapter 
investigates the extent to which immigration policy in the four countries has affected the 
racialization of their national identities, through the mechanism of demographic shifts. 
In the early half of the nineteenth century, most immigrants from western Europe were 
welcomed — and actively recruited — to Canada,67 New Zealand, the United States,68 and 
Australia. However, the latter half of the century saw the onset of restrictive policy based on race 
and national origin. This chapter traces the similarities and differences in immigration policy in 
these countries from the onset of restrictive policy to the present. It finds broad similarities in 
how the policies in each country have created more multiethnic states. However, as the 
demographic makeups of the countries have changed in similar ways, conceptions of national 
identity have not changed in congruence. 
 
 
67 Throughout the 1840s and 1850s, British immigration was heavily encouraged by the government, for example 
through setting up offices in the UK to begin promotion work. See: Valerie Knowles, Strangers at Our Gates: 
Canadian Immigration and Immigration Policy, 1540-1990 (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1992), 42–44. 
68 American citizens at the time claimed a similar ethnic heritage to western Europeans. See: Sue Yong and Rob 
Vosslamber, “Race and Tax Policy: The Case of the Chinese Poll Tax,” Journal of Australian Taxation 20, no. 1 
(2018): 155. 
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1800s Asian Exclusion 
The exclusive immigration policies of the four case countries have their roots in the early 
gold rushes of the nineteenth century. Chinese migration surged after gold was discovered in 
California (United States) in 1848, in Australia in 1851, in British Columbia (Canada) in 1858, 
and in New Zealand in 1861.69 Each country responded similarly through their immigration 
policies.  
In Australia, individual colonies took restrictive action against Chinese immigration in 
the 1850s and 1860s, including imposing a poll tax on all Chinese arrivals, until a uniform 
restriction was adopted in 1888. In 1896, the colonies extended the restriction to “all coloured 
races.”70 In 1901, the Commonwealth of Australia enacted the Pacific Island Labourers Act, 
which allowed for the deportation of Pacific Island workers and imposed a ban on further 
migration.71 Shortly after, Australia officially adopted the Immigration Restriction Act, 
commonly known as the White Australia policy, which excluded non-Europeans from 
immigrating to Australia.72 The White Australia policy remained in effect for 72 years.73 
Although Canada did not employ legislation explicitly called an immigration restriction 
act, its immigration policy restricted Chinese migrants from the 1880s onward, and later, all non-
white immigrants. In 1885, an act was passed to levy a head tax of $50 on immigrants of Chinese 
origin, which was raised to $500 in 1903.74 In the first decade of the twentieth century, the 
Canadian Immigration Branch instructed its agents in the United States to withhold assistance to 
 
69 Freda Hawkins, Critical Years in Immigration: Canada and Australia Compared, McGill-Queen’s Studies in 
Ethnic History 2 (Kingston [Ont.]: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1989), 8. 
70 Hawkins, 13. 
71 “Pacific Island Labourers Act 1901,” C1901A00016 § (1901), 
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C1901A00016. 
72 Hawkins, Critical Years in Immigration, 11. 
73 Hawkins, 15. 
74 Knowles, Strangers at Our Gates, 48. 
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black Americans who wanted to immigrate to Canada. The quasi-official policy of excluding 
black Americans almost became official legislation in 1911, but was never implemented.75 Under 
a final act of exclusion, the Chinese Immigration Act of 1923 ensured complete termination of 
Chinese immigration.76 White Canada policies were abandoned in 1962, 11 years ahead of White 
Australia policies.77 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, European New Zealanders saw Chinese gold 
miners as ‘sojourners’ or temporary visitors who were not to settle in New Zealand.78 The 
government enacted the Chinese Immigrants Act of 1881 which imposed a £10 poll tax on each 
Chinese person entering New Zealand, in addition to allowing only one Chinese entry per 10 
tons of cargo. Similar to the Canadian amendments, the poll tax was increased to £100 in 1896, 
and one Chinese was allowed for every 200 tons of cargo.79 The poll tax, only abolished in 
1944,80 was similar to that imposed in Canada and Australia as it required approval from the 
British Crown.81 The government passed the Asiatic Restriction Act of 1896 which stated “it is 
expedient to safeguard the race-purity of the people of New Zealand by preventing the influx 
into the colony of persons of alien race including Asiatic.”82 The act defined Asiatic to include 
Asia and its islands but exclude “persons of European or Jewish extraction,” or migrants from 
India, as it was also part of the British Empire.83 Despite objections from the British government, 
New Zealand tried to pass legislation to restrict Indian and other Asian immigrants.84 In 1899, 
 
75 Knowles, 85–86. 
76 Hawkins, Critical Years in Immigration, 19. 
77 Hawkins, 8. 
78 Yong and Vosslamber, “Race and Tax Policy,” 150. 
79 Yong and Vosslamber, 150–51. 
80 Yong and Vosslamber, 152. 
81 Yong and Vosslamber, 149. 
82 “Asiatic Restriction Act 1896 (NZ),” 60 Victoriae 1896 No 64 § (1896). 
83 Asiatic Restriction Act 1896 (NZ). 
84 Ann Beaglehole, “Immigration Regulation - 1881–1914: Restrictions on Chinese and Others,” Web page, Te Ara 
Encyclopedia of New Zealand, August 18, 2015, https://teara.govt.nz/en/immigration-regulation/page-2. 
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New Zealand enacted the Immigration Restriction Act which prohibited the entry of immigrants 
who were not of British or Irish ancestry or could not fill out the application form in “any 
European language.” This was effective in keeping out the Chinese, Indians, and other “race 
aliens.”85 
The United States responded to increased Chinese migration with a similar poll tax 
scheme in California. In 1852, a poll tax of $50 was imposed on every Chinese immigrant, and in 
1862, a further Chinese Police Tax was imposed on almost all Chinese people in California.86 In 
1882, the United States Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act which limited legal 
immigration to 100 Chinese immigrants a year and banned immigrants from bringing their 
wives. This act was renewed in 1892 and 1902, and not repealed until 1943.87 The Chinese 
Exclusion Act slowed but did not entirely halt migration from China — the Chinese were the 
most obvious group of illegal immigrants on the west coast at the turn of the twentieth century.88 
In contrast, the other three countries legislated for a complete and effective ban on Chinese 
migration. 
 
Interwar Years, 1919-1939 
During the interwar years, none of the case countries were tolerant towards non-European 
immigration. Non-discriminatory immigration policy was too contentious to suggest in both 
Canada and Australia, and both countries focused on attracting and recruiting British immigrants 
 
85 Beaglehole. 
86 Yong and Vosslamber, “Race and Tax Policy,” 156. 
87 Yong and Vosslamber, 157. 
88 John S. W. Park, Immigration Law and Society (Cambridge, UK ; Medford, MA: Polity Press, 2018), 20. 
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in the 1920s. Canada categorized central and northern Europe as “the preferred countries” for 
immigration and decided to encourage immigration from these countries in 1928.89  
New Zealand prohibited Germans and Austro-Hungarians from entering without a permit 
from the attorney general under the Undesirable Immigrants Exclusion Act of 1919. Until 1947, 
the Immigration Restriction Amendment Act of 1920 required non-British or Irish immigrants to 
apply for entry, and was used to curb immigration from Asia and southern Europe.90 
The United States also moved towards exclusion during these years. The Gentlemen’s 
Agreement of 1907 restricted immigration from the Empire of Japan, and the Immigration Act of 
1917 created an Asiatic Barred Zone, restricting all immigrants from Asia.91 In 1921, the 
government enacted the Emergency Quota Act, which allocated each sending nation an 
immigration quota equal to 3% of the foreign-born population of that country on the 1910 
census.92 This was extended and made permanent by the Immigration Act of 1924 which shifted 
the target quotas to match the 1890 census, favoring immigration from ‘Nordic’ Europe.93 In 
1919 Senator James D. Phelan said, “our business is to build up, as the Australians are so 
gallantly trying to do, a white man’s country.”94 However, with the perception of being 
‘raceless,’ this act also had the effect of restricting white immigration from the British 
dominions, with Australia, New Zealand and South Africa only receiving the bare minimum 
quota of 100 entries in 1929.95 In the late 1920s, Mexicans were also targeted for immigration 
restriction. Nativist organizations sought to restrict the entry of Mexicans based on their racial 
 
89 Hawkins, Critical Years in Immigration, 26–28. 
90 Ann Beaglehole, “Immigration Regulation - 1914–1945: Restrictions on Non-British Immigration,” Web page, Te 
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ineligibility to citizenship, but this was complicated by the difficulty to racially categorize them 
and the fact that the U.S. conquest of Mexico stipulated automatic citizenship for Mexicans in 
conquered areas.96 While Congress did not impose quotas on Mexican immigrants or exclude 
them on racial grounds, it sought to exclude them administratively. In 1929, U.S. Consuls 
refused visas to all Mexican laborers by strictly enforcing existing provisions of immigration 
law, such as through the ban on contract labor and the literacy test. Mexican immigration, which 
had averaged around 59,000 per year, dropped to 3,000 per year in two years.97 By the late 
1920s, deportation of illegal immigrants was also not racially equitable — when confronted by 
Immigration Services, illegal European immigrants were more likely to avoid deportation than 
Mexicans.98 
 
Post-World War Two 
The era following World War Two brought dramatic change to immigration policy in all 
four countries — but at varying times. 
After the war, Australia had an urgent need to expand its economy through immigration, 
and adopted a “populate or perish” attitude. However, its goal was to expand while preserving a 
British majority. The initial 1945 proposal comprised admitting British and other European 
immigrants in a ratio of 10 to 1, but practical considerations resulted in entry of 170,000 
displaced Europeans between 1947 and 1952.99 This led to broad recruitment of all European 
nationalities in the 1950s and even limited recruitment from the Middle East. The White 
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Australia policy stood, but the government began to liberalize policy in the second half of the 
1960s. In 1966, the government abolished the discriminatory provision introduced in 1957 which 
only allowed non-Europeans to naturalize after 15 years of residency, compared with five years 
for Europeans.100 The same year, the House of Representatives announced a move to evaluate 
each migrant application based on skills, but that Australia would maintain an aim of preserving 
a homogenous population.101 In 1973, the newly elected Whitlam government instituted a new 
immigration policy which entirely disregarded race as a factor for selection.102 
Canada did not have the same security concerns as Australia after World War Two, so its 
government categorized immigration as a low public policy priority.103 Although the post-war 
government under Prime Minister Mackenzie King repealed the Chinese Immigration Act in 
1947, his accompanying statement in the House of Commons effectively preserved White 
Canada for another 15 years.104 He asserted that existing restrictions on Asiatic immigration must 
remain and that the government was opposed to “large-scale immigration from the Orient.”105 
The new Immigration Act of 1952 placed all authority of selection of immigrants to the 
discretion of the cabinet, based on factors such as nationality, ethnic group, and ability to 
assimilate.106 Finally, in 1962, new regulations eliminated race as a factor in immigrant selection 
— applicants were considered for education and other skills, irrespective of race or national 
origin. The one discriminatory facet that remained was that only Europeans and those from the 
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Americas could sponsor a wide range of relatives, but this was abolished in 1967.107 Canada 
became the first of the three large immigrant receiving countries (ahead of the United States and 
Australia) and New Zealand to abolish discriminatory policy. 
Similar to Australia, New Zealand experienced a labor shortage following the war. 
Driven by this, in 1947, the government introduced schemes to encourage immigrants from the 
United Kingdom. However, the continued labor shortage in the 1950s forced the government to 
extend the scheme to include Dutch, Danish, Swiss, Austrian, and German immigrants under 35 
years of age.108 The Department of External Affairs explicitly defended discriminatory regulation 
towards Asians in a memo in 1953: “Our immigration is based firmly on the principle that we are 
and intend to remain a country of European development. It is inevitably discriminatory against 
Asians – indeed against all persons who are not wholly of European race and colour. Whereas 
we have done much to encourage immigration from Europe, we do everything to discourage it 
from Asia.”109 Like in Canada and Australia, policy liberalization began in the 1960s with the 
Immigration Amendment Act of 1961 which required all non-New Zealand citizens (except 
Australians) to have a permit before entering. British and non-British people were equal for the 
first time in law, but in practice, this was only a formality for the British and Irish who were 
issued with permits on arrival.110 In 1974, for the first time, immigration policy aimed at 
fulfilling skill shortages regardless of race or nationality replaced discriminatory regulations.111  
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Similar to Australia and New Zealand’s experience, World War Two caused a labor 
shortage in the United States. In 1941, the government implemented the Bracero Program, a joint 
agreement with Mexico to bring temporary Mexican agricultural laborers to work in the 
Southwest. Five million Mexicans went to the United States under the program which ended in 
1965.112 Although the policy encouraged many Mexicans to move to the United States, many 
Mexican nationals migrated outside the Bracero program, which prompted a contradictory 
program in 1954: Operation Wetback deported Mexican workers, many of whom were American 
citizens that were wrongfully removed.113 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 
commonly known as the McCarran-Walter Act, pointed in the direction of policy liberalization. 
It abolished Asian exclusion and removed official race and nationality barriers to citizenship. 
However, it granted a minimal quota of only 100 entries per year to Asian countries and imposed 
a quota to restrict non-white immigration from Jamaica, while continuing to exempt the Western 
Hemisphere from quotas to exploit cheap Mexican labor.114 The landmark Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1965, passed by President Lyndon B. Johnson, altogether removed the 
nationality quota system which heavily favored British, Irish, and German immigrants and 
replaced it with a system based on non-racialized and non-nationality-based preferences, with 
each region and country receiving an equal allotment of visas.115 
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Post-1970s 
After each case country dismantled explicit race-based immigration policy, each 
implemented a preference system, but with slightly different focuses. All four countries followed 
a model of immigration favoring human capital (traits such as education) and family 
reunification, but since the 1990s, New Zealand, Canada, and Australia began to move away 
from this towards a labor-market focused model.116 In the United States, the legalization of 
unauthorized migrants has become an important policy debate.117 
However, the post 1970s era has seen differences among countries. Notably, in New 
Zealand, although immigration officially became non-discriminatory in 1974, scholars have 
critiqued the government’s use of immigration policy as a tool to “whiten the population.”118 
Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, as successive public opinion polls showed xenophobia 
towards Asian immigration, the government responded by implementing tighter English 
language requirements.119 In Canada, policy liberalization led to a dramatic change in the 
demographics of immigrants: from a large majority of European migration in 1966, the 1970s 
and 1980s saw majorities coming from Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America.120 The 
United States implemented the Diversity Visa Lottery through the Immigration Act of 1990, 
which granted permanent residency allotments to nationals of underrepresented countries. 
Literature on the consequences of this program has been abundant and varied, with some 
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scholars critiquing it as a way to minimize Mexican and Asian immigration while maximizing 
European and African immigration.121 
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Figure 12. Timeline of key race-based immigration policies in the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada 1850-2000 
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Comparison and Evaluation 
Through analysis of the development of immigration policy, it is evident that the four 
countries all experienced similar demographic shifts because of loosening immigration 
restrictions. Each country originally had extremely restrictive policies that allowed for (and at 
times encouraged) migration from Europe, while reducing immigrants from outside of Europe. 
Each country then began policy liberalization in the latter half of the twentieth century, leading 
to far more multiethnic populations than previously seen. While the demographic makeups of the 
countries have changed in similar ways, conceptions of national identity have not. As Australia 
and New Zealand experienced large increases in Asian migration, their national identities 
remained more racialized and ‘white-exclusive’ than the United States’ or Canada’s. Since 
immigration policies among the four countries are broadly similar while national identity 
conceptions are vastly different (shown in the Scale of Ethnocentrism), immigration policy is 
unlikely to account for the variation in the racialization of the four countries’ national identities. 
Of course, differences between the countries’ immigration policies do exist. However, 
even if we examine these nuanced differences more closely, the variation observed in 
immigration policy nevertheless does not entirely match with the ranking on the Scale of 
Ethnocentrism. Overall, the least restrictive immigration policy history belonged to Canada, 
followed by the United States and then Australia. New Zealand’s immigration policy 
development has been the most restrictive of the case countries. 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, each of the countries responded to increased 
Chinese migration by implementing poll taxes on Chinese arrivals, although the United States 
and Australia imposed these a few decades before they began in Canada and New Zealand. The 
similarities continued as each country moved to tighten regulations against Chinese at the turn of 
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the century. Again, the timeline differed with the United States implementing the first Chinese 
Exclusion Act, and Canada the last. 
During the interwar years, each country moved to solidify restrictions, but divergences 
emerged. Canada took more restrictive action against Chinese immigrants. The United States 
continued restricting Asian immigration, but also moved to limit immigration overall. However, 
rhetorically, the immigration quotas appeared ‘raceless,’ as they also imposed quotas on other 
British-settler nations. Official rhetoric still indicated that the United States preferred Nordic 
European immigration, while it became clear that New Zealand was even more restrictive — the 
government favored British and Irish immigrants above any others, even including Southern 
Europeans, with a ban on Germans and Austro-Hungarians immediately after World War One. 
After the second world war, Australia, New Zealand and the United States experienced 
labor shortages which caused some expansions to immigration regulation. Australia’s ‘populate 
or perish’ scheme broadened policies to include all European nationalities, while New Zealand 
reluctantly opened up to Western Europe. The United States started the Bracero Program to 
attract Mexican labor. The 1950s continued to bring elite rhetoric against Asians in New Zealand 
(and even Canada), but Canada and the United States were the first countries to begin policy 
liberalization in the early 1950s. Canada abolished racialized immigration criteria in 1962, and 
although the United States deported Mexican laborers (and some U.S. citizens, wrongfully) in 
the late 1950s, it embraced non-racialized immigration policy in 1965. Australia eventually 
followed suit by 1973. New Zealand attempted to hold on longer to its policies, with 
liberalization beginning in the 1960s, and full rejection of race-based immigration embraced in 
the mid-1970s. 
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In the post-1970s era, the countries have diverged further. The New Zealand government 
oftentimes used immigration policy as a tool to curb rapid Asian immigration, reminiscent of 
past anti-Asian attitudes. Canada and Australia’s models focus on the labor market, whereas the 
issue of unauthorized immigration has become salient in the United States. 
In aggregate, Canada and the United States’ less restrictive immigration policies appear 
to account for their relatively less racialized national identities on the Scale of National 
Ethnocentrism compared with Australia and New Zealand. However, Canada has the least 
restrictive policy, which does not explain why it has a more racialized national identity than the 
United States, nor does Australia’s immigration policy explain why its national identity is more 
racialized than New Zealand’s. 
The Scale of National Ethnocentrism also roughly matches the timeline of key 
immigration policies. Canada and the United States were just ahead of Australia and New 
Zealand in dismantling their racialized immigration policies. Rhetorically, New Zealand and 
Australia also held onto British preferences for longer and continued advocating against Asian 
immigration in the 1950s and 1960s. However, regardless of timing, the patterns and trends 
remain similar across each case country. A difference of a decade between the dismantling of 
similar policies cannot explain the nuanced variation observed in the first part of the present 
investigation. Although immigration policy could have contributed to the national conversation 
around different ethnic groups, it cannot have created the variation in national identity and racial 
attitudes across the four cases observed in the public opinion data. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: INSTITUTIONAL MULTICULTURALISM 
 
 
While immigration policy determines who is allowed to enter a country, governments 
often institute domestic policies and programs aimed at shaping attitudes towards ethnic 
minorities already in the country. Legislative affirmations, programs, institutions, and other 
government initiatives that promote multiculturalism can shape public opinion on belonging of 
ethnic minorities through the mechanism of increased systemic inclusiveness. 
Multiculturalism theory has posited that affirmation of group identities leads to higher 
levels of acceptance towards ethnic out-groups,122 while some social psychological theories such 
as social identity theory (SIT) have emphasized negative outcomes stemming from social 
categorization.123 Those on the SIT side of the argument argue that group identification leads to 
in-group protective behaviors.124 On the other hand, scholarship has found empirical evidence 
that multicultural policies do not fuel majority backlash125 or hinder societal engagement;126 
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instead, modest evidence shows that they promote inclusive membership and increase national 
belonging of ethnic minorities.127 
This investigation contributes to the debate through a comparative lens — it uses two 
measures of institutional multiculturalism to determine whether governmental efforts contribute 
to a less racially-exclusive national identity. The first is governmental affirmations of 
multiculturalism through policy, and the second looks at governmental offices and programs that 
promote multiculturalism. These programs include both ethnic culture-centered initiatives and 
immigrant integration programs. Both of these measures contribute to increased systemic 
inclusiveness, which has the potential to influence public opinion. 
 
Affirmations of Multiculturalism in Policy 
Canada and Australia have both explicitly affirmed principles of multiculturalism in 
federal policy, while New Zealand and the United States have not. In the 1970s, the prime 
ministers of Australia and Canada announced an official federal policy of multiculturalism. New 
Zealand has remained legislatively committed to biculturalism, while the United States has not 
made any federal-level policy affirmations on cultural diversity. 
Until the dismantling of White Canada and White Australia, both countries’ policies 
shifted to emphasize the assimilation of immigrants.128 In the 1960s, a ‘new nationalism’ 
movement developed in Canada under Prime Minister Lester Pearson, who commented that the 
new Maple Leaf flag encapsulated the construction of new local symbols to replace British race 
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patriotism.129 Importantly, Quebecois nationalism was developing among French-Canadians at 
this time, and the Pearson government responded by emphasizing a Canadian identity that 
included French-Canadians, with the official adoption of bilingualism in 1969.130 Hence, 
biculturalism was a large facet of this ‘new nationalism’ movement, and integration was the 
foundation of official policy towards migrants in the 1960s.131 Biculturalism and bilingualism 
then became the main precursors to the rise of multiculturalism as various other ethnic groups, 
such as the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, voiced dissatisfaction with biculturalism. In 1971, 
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau announced an official policy of multiculturalism in Canada, 
emphasizing that although there were two official languages, there was no official culture, nor 
did one ethnic group take priority over another.132 This landmark declaration had the 
fundamental goal of improving intercultural relations through two pillars: support for the 
maintenance and development of cultural communities and the promotion of intercultural contact 
and the reduction of barriers.133 This became enshrined in the Canadian Multiculturalism Act of 
1988. 
Canadian Multiculturalism Act 1988 — Key Clauses on Canadian National Identity 
3 (1) It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government of Canada to 
• (a) recognize and promote the understanding that multiculturalism reflects the 
cultural and racial diversity of Canadian society and acknowledges the freedom of all 
members of Canadian society to preserve, enhance and share their cultural heritage; 
• (b) recognize and promote the understanding that multiculturalism is a 
fundamental characteristic of the Canadian heritage and identity and that it 
provides an invaluable resource in the shaping of Canada’s future…134 
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Not only was the Prime Minister’s formal announcement instituted by the Canadian 
Multiculturalism Act of 1988, but the Canadian government also agreed to include an affirmation 
of multiculturalism in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. For example, Section 27 of 
the Charter states: “This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation 
and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.”135  
In addition, Canada also legislates for minority representation in mainstream media. The 
Broadcasting Act 1991 stipulates that the programming provided by the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation should “reflect the multicultural and multiracial nature of Canada,” and that any 
programming provided by alternative services should also “reflect Canada’s regions and 
multicultural nature.”136 
Australia also had a similar ‘new nationalism’ movement, but the demise of Britishness 
and the need for a local identity was triggered predominantly by external events such as the UK 
accession to the European Economic Community in 1973, rather than a similar Quebecois 
nationalism movement.137 Integration was at the core of the government’s approach to migration 
during the early to mid 1970s, but multiculturalism replaced this in the latter half of the decade. 
Soon after the election of Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser in 1975, his administration began 
promoting multiculturalism as the central idea of national identity.138 A government-appointed 
body recommended a series of programs to support multiculturalism in a special report in 1977, 
which the government accepted, affirming Australia as a multicultural nation.139 In a 1978 
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parliamentary speech, seven years following Canada’s declaration, Prime Minister Fraser 
announced “[t]he Government accepts that it is now essential to give significant further 
encouragement to develop a multicultural attitude in Australian society. It will foster the 
retention of the cultural heritage of different ethnic groups and promote intercultural 
understanding.”140 
Recognized as the foundation of Australian multiculturalism, the Racial Discrimination 
Act, passed in 1975, outlawed racial discrimination in certain areas of public life, satisfying 
Australia’s commitments under the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all forms 
of Racial Discrimination.141 However, scholarship has criticized the act’s limited ability to 
actually promote multiculturalism. One criticism has argued that it focuses on individual, 
discrete forms of discrimination and not social, political, and economic experiences of difference 
and that it has no impact on how minorities are represented in media.142 However, like the 
Canadian Broadcasting Act, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act of 1983 specifies that 
the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), the country’s national broadcaster, must 
“contribute to a sense of national identity and inform and entertain, and reflect the cultural 
diversity of [emphasis added], the Australian community.”143 
In contrast, neither the United States nor New Zealand has instituted any explicit national 
policies affirming multiculturalism. The United States has made no affirmation of 
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multiculturalism in federal policy.144 A search of “multicultural” in the United States Code 
reveals no statutes that uphold multiculturalism in a manner similar to that of Canada or 
Australia.145 Similarly, New Zealand has made almost no explicit affirmation of multiculturalism 
in national-level policy. A search of “multicultural” in New Zealand statutes reveals one 
mention:146 The Law Commission Act 1985 stipulates that the Commission must “take into 
account te ao Maori (the Maori dimension) and shall also give consideration to the multicultural 
character of New Zealand society.”147 However, like Australia and Canada, New Zealand 
implemented a Broadcasting Act which stipulates that one of the primary functions of the 
Broadcasting Commission is “to ensure that a range of broadcasts is available to provide for the 
interests of … minorities in the community including ethnic minorities.”148 This calls for 
programming that caters to minorities’ interests, rather ensuring minority representation, for 
which Australia and Canada legislates. 
Significantly, and in contrast to the other countries, the relative lack of statutory 
multiculturalism is explained by New Zealand’s legislative commitment to biculturalism. The 
Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand’s founding document, is based on a principle of state 
biculturalism between the Crown and Māori.149 Extensive scholarship has documented the 
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difficulties and tensions between biculturalism and multiculturalism in New Zealand society.150 
In particular, attempts at state-sponsored multiculturalism would be treated with suspicion and 
controversy by Māori.151 Hence, “biculturalism has occupied the pre-eminent place of political 
and policy debates, and there has been little room for multiculturalism.”152 
Notably, biculturalism was a large part of high-level national identity discussions in both 
Canada and New Zealand. However, biculturalism led to the emergence of multiculturalism 
policy in Canada when Ukrainian Canadians pressed for more inclusion, while it did not have a 
similar effect in New Zealand. In Canada, the presence of a white, non-British immigrant 
minority during biculturalism debates led to shifts towards explicitly multicultural policies, 
whereas New Zealand’s British and Irish-exclusive immigration policies may have contributed to 
biculturalism’s endurance in the country as there was a lack of credible opposition to 
biculturalism. However, similarities exist between policy in Canada and Australia. As the 
significance of British identity diminished, both countries required a new local national 
identity.153 New Zealand legislators hung onto Britishness as one pillar of its bicultural national 
identity, at the expense of affirmations of multiculturalism. Australia and the United States never 
experienced official biculturalism — but the demise of Britishness in Australia led to a 
multicultural project, while the United States has not affirmed multiculturalism in policy. 
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Government Programs Supporting Multiculturalism 
The presence of government programs that support multiculturalism in the four countries 
follows a similar pattern to one found in these countries’ affirmations of multiculturalism. For 
this investigation, ‘government programs’ include both institutions promoting culture and 
diversity and immigrant-integration programs. Canada has the most extensive array of 
government departments, offices, and initiatives aimed at upholding multiculturalism. Australia 
also has various offices aimed at promoting multiculturalism and ethnic affairs. New Zealand has 
some governmental integration initiatives but limited multiculturalism offices compared to those 
found in Canada and Australia. The United States federal government has almost no 
multiculturalism or integration offices and initiatives, although individual states and localities 
take some responsibility in this area. 
Canada’s main institution supporting multiculturalism is the Department of Canadian 
Heritage, simply known as Canadian Heritage. Specifically, the Community Support, 
Multiculturalism, and Anti-Racism Initiatives Program (known as the Multiculturalism Program) 
— under the mandate of Canadian Heritage — has three funding components: events, projects 
and community capacity building aimed at supporting intercultural understanding.154 The 
Multicultural Program shifted between the jurisdiction of Canadian Heritage and Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada (CIC), but its policy objectives have revolved around identity, social 
justice, and civic participation.155 Although Canadian Heritage and CIC have been the main 
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players in promoting multiculturalism, many other federal departments contribute in other areas 
of immigrant integration, such as Human Resources and Social Development Canada and Status 
of Women Canada.156 With its Action Plan against Racism, Canadian Heritage has served as a 
leader in linking federal departments and coordinating efforts supporting multiculturalism.157 
Aside from programs explicitly promoting cultural development, Canada has also led in the field 
of immigration integration programs. From 1947 to the early 1990s, language learning programs 
for immigrants were focused on assimilation, but since the early 1990s they have centered 
around integration and preparing new immigrants for the Canadian labor market.158 Canada’s 
adoption of provincial-level commitments to multiculturalism also emphasizes the country’s 
position as a leader of policy affirmations of multiculturalism. After Canada declared a national 
multicultural policy, many provinces acted quickly to institute their own acts and mandates.159 
The national government also has various agreements with provinces, which either incorporate 
them in decision-making, or fully devolve responsibilities to the provinces over immigrant 
settlement initiatives. One such example is the Canada-Ontario Immigration agreement.160 
After Australia affirmed multiculturalism in the 1970s, the government established 
multicultural resource centers and expanded existing settlement services, such as English 
language teaching, on-arrival accommodation and orientation assistance, interpreting and 
translating services, and assistance with overseas qualifications recognition.161 The Fraser 
government also established the Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs (AIMA) which 
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advised the government on multicultural affairs.162 However, this was replaced by the Office of 
Multicultural Affairs (OMA) in 1987. The OMA, currently under the purview of the Department 
of Home Affairs, sponsors a few programs that promote multiculturalism: the Fostering 
Integration Grants Scheme helps community organizations deliver programs that assist migrant 
integration; the Community Languages Multicultural Grants Program funds community language 
schools to help young Australians learn another language in their community.163 In 1997, the 
Prime Minister announced a new National Multicultural Advisory Council, now named the 
Australian Multicultural Council (AMC), which provides independent advice to the government 
on multicultural affairs, social cohesion, and integration policy and programs.164 Additionally, 
through the 1980s, states and territories instituted Ethnic Affairs Commissions and Migrant 
Settlement Councils, and there was a nationwide consolidation of multicultural institutions.165 
While Australia’s governmental introduction of multicultural programs draw similarities 
to Canada’s, it is not as extensive — Canada’s programs extend across many federal 
departments, including ones ostensibly unrelated to multiculturalism, while Australia has a 
specific department that delivers multicultural programs. However, both countries have local-
level institutions targeted at advancing multicultural policy. 
Formal institutions promoting multiculturalism were essentially non-existent in New 
Zealand until the turn of the twenty-first century, when Prime Minister Helen Clark’s Labour 
government set cultural diversity as a key policy priority. An Office of Ethnic Affairs was 
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established, later renamed the Office of Ethnic Communities.166 Under the Department of 
Internal Affairs, the Office serves as the “government’s principal advisor on ethnic diversity in 
New Zealand.” It also provides information and services to ethnic communities and administers 
funds to support community development and social cohesion. It specifically caters to those who 
identify their ethnicity as Asian, African, Continental European, Latin American, and Middle 
Eastern167 — notably this leaves out Pacific Islanders and Māori, who fall under the jurisdiction 
of the Ministry for Pacific Peoples168 and the Ministry of Māori Development,169 respectively. 
However, the Office of Ethnic Communities operates under the sole responsibility of the 
Minister of Ethnic Communities, as there are “no legislation, Crown entities or statutory bodies 
associated with this portfolio.”170 
Another major pillar of the Labour government’s early 2000s policy was the Migrant 
Settlement and Integration Strategy (the Strategy), which has five outcome goals for immigrant 
integration: employment, education and training, English language, inclusion, and health and 
wellbeing. For each outcome, the Unit offers services and programs to new migrants, for 
example, funding for English classes, or New Kiwis, a service matching migrants to 
employers.171 
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Although they are less extensive, New Zealand’s programs aimed at including and 
integrating ethnic minorities draw similarities to Canada’s and Australia’s. However, they began 
many decades later, at the turn of the twenty-first century. 
While in Canada, immigrant groups receive integration support and ethnic development 
through financial and symbolic support, the United States government favors “distant, neutral 
relations with immigrants, ethnic organizations, and community advocates.”172 Its community 
building policy has been “largely laissez-faire,” with only recognized refugees allowed to access 
government resettlement funds.173 The former U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) did not offer new immigrants any programs similar to those in Canada.174 One minor 
program is U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ (USCIS) Citizenship and Assimilation 
Grant Program, which gives grants to public or private nonprofit organizations to provide 
citizenship instruction and naturalization application assistance to lawful permanent residents.175 
However, this program is minor compared to the abundance of immigrant integration programs 
in the other countries and it is only targeted at lawful permanent residents. The relative lack of 
Congressional or federal action on both immigrant integration and ethnic culture promotion has 
led state governments to implement programs such as funding for English language 
instruction.176 Overall, the United States has historically lacked institutions aimed at promoting 
multiculturalism through immigrant integration or other programs, directly contrasting the other 
three case countries which all have integration programs and other cultural empowerment efforts. 
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Comparison and Evaluation 
Table 3. Institutional Multiculturalism Comparison 
 
Country Affirmations of Multiculturalism in Policy Government Programs Supporting 
Multiculturalism 
Canada • 1971: PM announces official policy 
of multiculturalism 
• 1982: Multiculturalism recognized in 
Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms 
• 1988: Canadian Multiculturalism Act 
• 1991: Broadcasting Act 
• 1988: Multiculturalism 
Program 
• Programs in multiple federal 
departments (Canadian 
Heritage leading) 
• Immigrant integration 
programs 
• Provincial-level programs 
Australia • 1975: Racial Discrimination Act 
• 1978: PM announces official policy 
of multiculturalism 
• 1983: Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation Act 
• 1979: Australian Institute of 
Multicultural Affairs [Office of 
Multicultural Affairs] 
• 1997: National Multicultural 
Advisory Council [Australian 
Multicultural Council] 
• Immigrant integration 
programs 
• State/territory programs 
New Zealand • None (affirmations of biculturalism 
instead) 
• 2001: Office of Ethnic 
Communities 
• 2004: Migrant Settlement and 
Integration Strategy 
United States • None • State programs 
 
The two facets of institutional multiculturalism that have been investigated are official 
affirmations and government programs. Government programs comprise initiatives that promote 
ethnic culture as well as immigrant integration programs. Both facets seek to increase systemic 
inclusiveness in a country, which can potentially influence public opinion. While institutions that 
promote ethnic culture clearly bolster ethnic groups’ belonging within the national community, 
immigrant integration programs are also important in the advancement of multiculturalism, as it 
fosters intercultural contact, and therefore a potentially less racialized national identity. For 
Source: Compiled by author. 
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example, Canada’s Multiculturalism Program has been based on a “two-way street” philosophy, 
where both immigrants and the host society adapt to create a multicultural society.177 
The degree to which each country embraces multiculturalism in its governmental 
institutions differs greatly. The Canadian government has been the most vocal about formally 
affirming multiculturalism, and it has also instituted federal programs on ethnic empowerment 
and immigrant integration, in addition to provincial and municipal government involvement. The 
Australian government has made similar affirmations, although it has not issued a formal act or 
amended its founding document to reflect multiculturalism in the same way Canada has. It has 
instituted formal offices that cater to multicultural affairs as well as implementing immigrant 
integration programs, so its efforts are comparable to those in Canada. Clearly, there is a 
difference when analyzing New Zealand and the United States, which both do not make any 
governmental level affirmations of multiculturalism. The New Zealand government is strongly 
committed to biculturalism, while the federal government in the United States remains neutral 
with respect to multiculturalism. Institutionally, New Zealand has fairly recently established 
offices that cater to ethnic communities as well as a well-developed immigrant settlement 
program, whereas the United States government offers no immigrant integration programs. 
The Scale of National Ethnocentrism, which classes the United States as the least 
racialized national identity, does not match the ranking of multiculturalism institutionalization. 
Australia has a high level of institutional multiculturalism at the governmental level, but it 
actually has the most racially-exclusive definition of national identity. Institutional 
multiculturalism is almost non-existent in the United States, even though it has the most racially-
accepting national identity. Although Canada and New Zealand’s relative institutionalizations of 
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multiculturalism may offer some insight into the relative exclusivity of their national identities, 
the cases of Australia and the United States indicate that, surprisingly, multiculturalism policies 
in government cannot cleanly explain what racializes a country’s national identity. 
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CHAPTER SIX: ETHNIC ACTIVISM 
 
 
Contrasting from institutional explanations for the racialization of national identity, 
ethnic activism represents a behavioral explanation of the Scale of National Ethnocentrism. 
Protests and activism have the ability to effect political and social change. This chapter explores 
the degree to which minority activism has affected public opinion in the four case countries. 
In the case of racialization of national identities, ethnic activism can advance public 
recognition of minority groups, thus instituting them as part of the national ingroup. This chapter 
first outlines existing literature on the effects of social movements on policy and public opinion. 
It then explores cases of ethnic activism in the four case countries, before noting the public 
recognition of minorities that activism has created in each. Public recognition is measured 
through commemorative history dates for minority groups and the presence of ethnic studies 
within academia. Finally, the countries are compared against the Scale of National 
Ethnocentrism to evaluate whether ethnic movements are a major cause of racialization of 
national identity. 
 
Effects of Social Movements 
Vast bodies of literature have explored the effects of social movements, in particular on 
policy development and public opinion. While this investigation focuses on how protests impact 
public opinion, it is important to acknowledge the wider impacts of social activism. 
In terms of policy impact, researchers have found that protest matters to differing degrees 
depending on the wider political climate and the stage of policy development. For example, 
protest movements can raise the salience of issues to legislators, evidenced by the U.S. 
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environmental movement,178 but a social movement’s policy impact is affected by the 
favorability of political opportunity structures.179 Additionally, U.S. Congressional attention to 
both rights issues and women’s suffrage movements have shown that protest has the most 
legislative impact during the agenda-setting stage of lawmaking.180 Similarly, Taiwan’s LGBT 
mobilization achieved success through favorable political conditions, including those created by 
the Sunflower Movement in 2014, another social movement.181 
Studies have also shown the impact of protest on public opinion shifts, notably in the 
realm of LGBT activism. While public opinion remains stable over time for many issues, LBGT 
rights have experienced a rapid transformation in public attitudes in recent decades. A key factor 
for this change has been LGBT activism, especially during the AIDS crisis.182 
Specifically on ethnic activism, studies have demonstrated the direct influence minority 
protest behavior has had on government institutions: increased pro-minority rights behavior has 
given cues to politicians to respond to these stated preferences.183 Movements have also been a 
crucial factor in influencing policy outcomes within the context of state ratification of the Equal 
Rights Amendment.184 Additionally, grassroots organizations and local protests during the civil 
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rights era in the United States pushed demands for social change into the consciousness of the 
public.185 
This investigation contributes to the literature on whether minority movements affect 
shifts in public opinion. While policy impacts of ethnic activism have been documented, it is 
argued here that ethnic activism changes public opinion on national identity, through raising 
awareness of ethnic minorities’ experiences, thus instituting them within the national conscience. 
 
Ethnic and Minority Movements 
During the second half of twentieth century, a fever for revolution and challenges of 
status quo discrimination spread across the globe, with the rise of numerous movements 
demanding increased rights for marginalized communities. However, ethnic minorities in the 
four case countries behaved very differently throughout these consequential decades. 
 
Figure 13. Presence of the phrase “ethnic activism” in global English literature, 1940-present 
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The presence and depth of ethnic movements in the four countries perfectly map with the 
ranking of the Scale of National Ethnocentrism, with the United States clearly exhibiting the 
highest level of minority activism, followed by Canada, New Zealand, and finally Australia. 
In the United States, minority activism dramatically escalated starting in the 1950s with 
the onset of the civil rights movement, a struggle for black Americans to gain equal rights under 
the law. There is an extensive body of scholarship documenting the movement and its effects on 
policy and social change, highlighting its saliency in American history.186 Key events of the civil 
rights movement included: Montgomery Bus Boycotts (1955-1956), Little Rock Nine (1957), 
Woolworth’s Lunch Counter (1960), Freedom Rides (1961), the Birmingham Campaign (1963), 
the March on Washington (1963), and Bloody Sunday (1965). The civil rights movement also 
spurred the rise of the Chicano Movement in the 1960s. This movement represented ethnic 
empowerment among Americans of Mexican descent and consisted of multiple movements 
including a youth movement, a farmworkers’ movement, the movement for political 
empowerment, and the struggle for control over “homelands” in the U.S. Southwest.187 The 
Black Panther Party for Self-Defense rose to prominence in the late 1960s and advocated for 
racial pride and community control of resources. Drawing inspiration from the Black Power and 
anti-war movements, the Asian American movement also emerged in the late 1960s as a 
coalition building campaign among Asians of all ethnicities.188 In San Francisco, the Black 
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Panthers helped Asian youth set up the Red Guard Party using a similar model to its own. A key 
development of the Asian American movement was the coining of the term “Asian American” 
when Yuji Ichioka co-founded the (explicitly pan-Asian) Asian American Political Alliance 
(AAPA).189 The creation of this phrase was crucial to the institutionalization of Asians as part of 
the American national community, thus reducing perceptions of Asians as foreigners and 
widening the inclusivity of the American national identity. 
Minority activism has also been present in Canadian history, but it has not been as 
consolidated or full-bodied as the United States movements. African Canadians often confronted 
racism through local activism and legislative mechanisms. They used formal anti-discrimination 
organizations to advocate for legislative protections such as the Fair Employment and Fair 
Accommodations laws. These organizations included the Nova Scotia Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NSAACP), Southwestern Ontario’s South Essex Citizen’s 
Advancement Association (SECAA), and the Negro Citizenship Association (NCA). Commonly, 
African Canadian activism efforts had ties to efforts from Jewish organizations combatting 
racism and religious discrimination such as the Jewish Labour Committee.190 Importantly, 
Canadian activists cited the United States civil rights movement as a reason for Canada to take 
more aggressive action against racism. They used the U.S. movement to challenge the notion that 
Canada was already sufficiently ahead of their southern neighbor on issues of racial tolerance 
and equality.191 One notable case of individual activism was the case of Viola Desmond, an 
activist who brought the struggles of African Canadians in Nova Scotia into the national 
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spotlight. By publicly rejecting segregation, Desmond became a national symbol in the struggle 
for equal rights.192 Asian Canadian movements were also tied to the Jewish Labour Committee 
as campaigns for anti-discrimination often coalesced around this committee. There were also 
specific committees aimed at particular legislative goals. In 1946, a group of Chinese Canadians 
formed the Committee for the Repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act.193 A redress campaign for 
Chinese Canadians discriminated against under the head tax and Chinese Exclusion Act began in 
1984. The Chinese Canadian National Council has been active in pursuing the redress as well as 
other goals related to anti-discrimination.194 Inspired by the Asian American movement, Asian 
Canadian youth formed groups which began a “radical Asian Canadian cultural production.”195 
The Asianadian, an anti-racist, anti-sexist, anti-homophobic social justice magazine raised 
Canadian consciousness of the Asian experience196 and played a key role in promoting a pan-
Asian identity.197  
As we move down the Scale of National Ethnocentrism to the more racialized 
nationalities, the relative decrease in minority activism becomes apparent. While scholarship on 
American minority movements is abundant, the lack of literature on ethnic activism in New 
Zealand and Australia is clear. 
In New Zealand, the nature of ethnic activism has historically been very different from 
that in North America, focusing on the plight of Māori, the indigenous population, rather than 
prominent immigrant groups. Influenced by the plethora of international movements in the 
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1960s, Māori protest movements emerged over independence, land, and waterways.198 In 1971, 
the first protests emerged at Waitangi during Waitangi Day celebrations (New Zealand’s public 
holiday commemorating the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi), and went on to become a regular 
occurrence. Waitangi Day activism has manifested in many forms of marches and protests and 
continued through to the 2000s.199 In the 1970s, Māori came together in cities, leading to social 
changes that became known as the ‘Māori renaissance.’ These developments all led to a 
thickening foundation of biculturalism in New Zealand.200 Aside from the Māori movements, 
New Zealand has seen limited amounts of activism from other groups. Directly inspired by the 
Black Panther Party in the United States, the Polynesian Panthers was established in 1971. It 
engaged in political activism, ran food co-ops, and promoted Pacific languages.201 The other 
major ethnic group in New Zealand — Asians — lack a history of activism similar to that 
observed in the United States and Canada. New Zealanders of Asian descent did not engage in a 
movement which instituted them within the national community in the same way that the Asian 
American movement did.  
Ultimately, New Zealand’s activist focus on the indigenous population further instituted 
biculturalism as the dominant societal objective, with multiculturalism taking a backseat. The 
lack of activism from other minority groups combined with a resurgence of Māori cultural pride 
contributed to the racialization of the ‘New Zealander’ label to most include those who appeared 
Māori or white. 
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Represented by the lack of scholarship in the area, Australia’s history almost completely 
lacks national activism movements from racial minorities who seek to institute their ethnic 
culture as Australian. However, there were a few isolated occurrences. Against a backdrop of 
increasing international attention on indigenous issues, Australia’s indigenous civil rights 
campaign emerged in the 1950s and 1960s. This movement challenged legislation on land rights 
and social benefits as well as raised awareness of discrimination and encouraged indigenous 
Australians to resist it.202 A landmark pamphlet titled ‘Control or Colour Bar? A Proposal for 
Change in the Australian Immigration System’ was published by the Immigration Reform Group 
(IRG) in 1960. This influential pamphlet challenged policy restricting Asian migration by stating 
that public opinion had shifted. Historians have regarded the pamphlet as key in dismantling the 
White Australia policy.203  
 
Effects of Ethnic Activism: Public Recognition of Ethnicity  
Ethnic activism affects public opinion towards national identity insofar as it garners 
recognition for ethnic groups’ presence within a nation and its history. This recognition, and thus 
the effects of ethnic activism, can be measured through commemorative dates and ethnic studies 
in academia. 
The United States celebrates heritage through a number of commemorative months, 
including African American History Month (February), National Hispanic Heritage Month 
(September 15 - October 15) and Asian Pacific Heritage Month (May).204 Canada, like the 
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March 7, 2020, https://australianstogether.org.au/discover/australian-history/civil-rights-movement/. 
203 Kate Darian‐Smith and James Waghorne, “Australian-Asian Sociability, Student Activism, and the University 
Challenge to White Australia in the 1950s,” Australian Journal of Politics & History 62, no. 2 (2016): 203–4, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajph.12245. 
204 Commemorative observances according to U.S. Government: Margaret Wood, “Commemorative Months | Law 
Library of Congress,” web page, April 2012, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/commemorative-observations/index.php. 
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United States, celebrates heritage through commemorative months: Black History Month and 
Asian Heritage Months are February and May respectively, and June 27 is Canadian 
Multiculturalism Day.205 New Zealand commemorates a number of Pacific Language Weeks and 
a Chinese Language Week, but there are no commemorative dates focused on diverse heritage 
like those in the United States and Canada.206 Australia does not officially have any 
commemorative history months, although the Department of Home Affairs publishes a lengthy 
calendar of cultural and religious dates to raise awareness.207 
Another measure of the extent of ethnic minority involvement in public life is the 
institutionalization of each group’s history within scholarly discourse. Formally acknowledging a 
group’s history at the elite academic level ingrains its narrative as part of the national 
community’s own history.  
In the United States, ethnic studies programs emerged directly as a result of activism that 
pursued this goal. Strikes and protests at San Francisco State University beginning in 1968 aimed 
to achieve goals for more curriculum and institutional control by minorities. After months of 
protests, a settlement was reached that created the first ever School of Ethnic Studies in the 
United States, a program that comprised American Indian studies, Asian American studies, 
Black studies, and La Raza studies.208 The legacy of this spread across the nation, with 
 
205 Commemorative observances according to Canadian Government: Canadian Heritage, “Important and 
Commemorative Days,” Government of Canada, October 16, 2017, https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-
heritage/services/important-commemorative-days.html. 
206 Ministry of Education, “Awareness Days/Weeks to Celebrate in ECE,” Ministry of Education, accessed March 7, 
2020, https://www.education.govt.nz/early-childhood/teaching-and-learning/learning-tools-and-
resources/awareness-days/. 
207 “Calendar of Cultural and Religious Dates,” Department of Home Affairs, accessed March 7, 2020, 
https://www.harmony.gov.au/events/calendar/. 
208 G. Omatsu, “The ‘Four Prisons’ and the Movements of Liberation : Asian American Activism from the 1960s to 
the 1990s,” in Asian American Studies Now : A Critical Reader, 2010, 302; Maeda, “The Asian American 
Movement.” 
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innumerable institutions of higher education offering ethnic studies programs.209 In 2017, 321 
degrees were awarded in Ethnic Studies.210 
In Canada, the presence of ethnic studies programs is more sporadic, with Asian 
Canadians noting a lack of “institutional space similar to Asian American Studies.”211 However, 
ethnic studies can be found at select universities in Canada. As of the present investigation, of 
the ten top-ranked universities212 in Canada, only one — University of Toronto — has a program 
focused on ethnic studies.213 The University of Toronto is also the only institution that offers an 
Asian Canadian Studies minor program.214 McGill University is the only other university to offer 
a Canadian Ethnic and Racial Studies minor, although it does not offer Asian Canadian or Black 
Canadian studies programs.215 The other universities do not offer formalized programs in ethnic 
studies.216 
New Zealand has eight universities. As of the writing of this thesis, none of the eight 
have ethnic studies programs that are comparable to Latino Studies, Asian American Studies, or 
African American Studies in the United States.217 Most of the universities offer 
Māori/Indigenous Studies programs218 and Asian Studies or Pacific Studies. These programs, 
 
209 Maeda, “The Asian American Movement.” 
210 “Ethnic Studies | Data USA,” accessed March 8, 2020, https://datausa.io/profile/cip/050200/. 
211 Li, Voices Rising, 23. 
212 According to the QS World University Rankings 2020. 
213 Robert F. Harney Professorship and Program in Ethnic, Immigration, and Pluralism Studies is a program within 
the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the University of Toronto. See: 
https://munkschool.utoronto.ca/ethnicstudies/about-us/ 
214 University of Toronto Undergraduate Programs: https://future.utoronto.ca/academics/undergraduate-programs/ 
215 See: https://www.mcgill.ca/study/2018-2019/faculties/arts/undergraduate/ug_arts_canadian_ethnic_racial_studies 
216 The other universities analyzed were: University of British Columbia, University of Alberta, Université de 
Montréal, McMaster University, University of Waterloo, University of Calgary, and Queen’s University.  
217 Analysis conducted through examining majors and minors offered under Bachelor of Arts programs at the eight 
universities: University of Auckland, University of Otago, Victoria University of Wellington, University of 
Canterbury, University of Waikato, Massey University, Lincoln University, and Auckland University of 
Technology. 
218 See, for example, Māori Studies at the University of Auckland: https://www.auckland.ac.nz/en/study/study-
options/find-a-study-option/maori-studies.html 
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however, are not focused on the history of Asian and Pacific Islander New Zealanders — they 
exclusively explore the regions of Asia and the Pacific, separate from New Zealanders of such 
ancestry, and are thus irrelevant to scholarship of ethnicity in New Zealand.219 
Academia looks similar in Australia. Of the top-ranked university in each of Australia’s 
seven states plus the Australian Capital Territory, none had majors or minors relating to the study 
of Australia’s minority ethnic groups (except for indigenous studies), as of this investigation.220 
Classes are occasionally offered on race and ethnicity,221 and many universities offer formalized 
indigenous studies programs, although not on other ethnicities in Australia. 
 
Comparison and Evaluation 
 
Table 4. Ethnic Movements Comparison 
 
Country Movements 
United States • Civil rights movement 
• Chicano Movement 
• Black Panther Party 
• Asian American movement 
o Emergence of term “Asian American” 
Canada • African Canadian activism 
o Legislative mechanisms 
• Asian Canadian activism 
o Redress committees 
o The Asianadian 
New Zealand • Māori renaissance and protests (impeded multiculturalism) 
• Polynesian Panthers 
• No Asian movements 
Australia • Aboriginal movement 
 
 
219 See, for example, Asian Studies at the University of Otago: 
https://www.otago.ac.nz/languagescultures/programmes/asian-studies/index.html 
220 Analysis conducted through examining majors and minors offered under Bachelor of Arts programs at the eight 
universities: University of Melbourne, University of Sydney, Australian National University, University of 
Queensland, University of Adelaide, University of Western Australia, University of Tasmania, Charles Darwin 
University. 
221 See, for example, class “Ethnicity, Religion and Race: Understanding Social Diversity” at the University of 
Tasmania: https://www.utas.edu.au/courses/cale/units/hga324-ethnicity,-religion-and-race-understanding-social-
diversity 
Source: Compiled by author. 
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Table 5. Effects of Ethnic Movements: Public Recognition of Ethnicity Comparison 
 
Country Commemorative Heritage Dates Ethnic Studies in Academia 
United 
States 
• African American History 
Month 
• National Hispanic Heritage 
Month 
• Asian Pacific Heritage Month 
• Consistent presence of Asian American 
studies, African American studies, and 
La Raza/Latino studies majors and 
minors 
Canada • Black History Month 
• Asian Heritage Month 
• Canadian Multiculturalism 
Day 
• Sporadic ethnic studies programs (2/10 
top ten universities offer ethnic studies 
minors) 
New 
Zealand 
• None • None (0/8 NZ universities offer ethnic 
studies majors/minors) 
Australia • None • None (0/8 top universities in each state 
offer ethnic studies majors/minors) 
 
The comparison of ethnic movements and public recognition of ethnicity in each country 
maps very closely with the ranking of countries on the Scale of National Ethnocentrism. 
The United States leads the four cases with the highest level of minority activism. 
Movements in the United States cleanly coalesced around specific goals for the three largest 
minority groups, and each movement drew momentum from the previous. Fundamentally, the 
Asian American movement created the term ‘Asian American,’ which was key in establishing 
those of Asian descent as fully American. The movement also brought together various Asian 
ethnicities under one umbrella term, instituting a new ‘Asian American’ identity, mitigating the 
view that they were foreigners from particular Asian countries. The presence of specific 
commemorative dates reflects public recognition of minority groups’ history as American 
history. Additionally, the presence of African American, Asian American, and Latino Studies in 
higher education has ensured that the histories of these groups are reflected clearly, accurately, 
and comprehensively. The ubiquity of ethnic studies programs in the United States further 
ingrains ethnic minorities within the national community. Hence, the United States’ ranking as 
Source: Compiled by author. 
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the least racially-exclusive national identity conforms to its history of activism and the 
recognition that arose as a result. 
Canada’s activism has drawn inspiration from movements in the United States, with a 
cultural awakening of black and Asian identity, but its history has not been organized as clearly. 
The relative lack of ethnic studies programs — especially Black Canadian and Asian Canadian 
studies programs — reflects this and has relegated Canada’s minority history to a few key 
moments and instances of activism. Nevertheless, ethnic studies does exist at some universities, 
even if it is not widely offered as a major or minor program of study. Canada also celebrates 
ethnic heritage through official commemorative months. It is also important to note that 
Canada’s minority activists used more legislative advocacy to gain more legal rights for 
minorities compared to U.S. activists’ tactics which focused on gaining public awareness. This 
key difference led to differing levels of public recognition for minorities, and thus explains the 
difference between the countries’ public attitudes towards who belongs in the national ingroup. 
While Canada earns its spot as the second least racialized national identity, there are clear 
differences between the country and its southern neighbor in their activist histories. 
The second most racialized national identity belongs to New Zealand, and there is a clear 
drop in minority activity compared with Canada. In New Zealand, most minority activism has 
come from Māori who also drew inspiration from international movements of the time. The 
abundance of indigenous activism further instituted a narrative of biculturalism in the nation, to 
the detriment of multiculturalism and a pan-racial, inclusive national identity. However, there 
were small occurrences of Pacific Islander activism. As New Zealand minorities engaged in less 
activism, they also gained less public recognition than American and Canadian minorities. The 
lack of both official commemorative heritage dates and ethnic studies programs in New Zealand 
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(and abundance of indigenous studies programs) clearly situates the country on a different plane 
than its North American counterparts. New Zealand’s history of ethnic activism therefore 
matches its ranking of having a more racialized national identity than the United States and 
Canada. 
Australia’s history of minority activism is comparable to that of New Zealand. It has had 
no prominent minority movements, although it has had a few isolated occurrences of ethnic 
activism, including from indigenous Australians. The lack of commemorative dates as well as 
ethnic studies programs in universities also substantiates the relative dearth of ethnic history, as 
is the case in New Zealand. However, Australia’s indigenous activism has also been less salient 
than the New Zealand Māori renaissance. This could have led to less non-white public activity 
overall, leading to a relatively more white-exclusive Australian national identity than in New 
Zealand. Again, a diminished history of ethnic activism and the resulting lack of public 
recognition conforms with the country’s ranking as the most racialized national identity of the 
four case countries. 
It is important to recognize that in each of the four countries, differing political 
landscapes as well as social conditions would have caused differing levels of ‘need’ for minority 
activism. However, regardless of the causes of protest, the presence of minority activism is 
crucial in achieving public recognition for minorities’ plights, histories, and overall presence 
within a country. Therefore, even if there were a lack of protest in a country because of sufficient 
policy responsiveness to minority issues, the lack of protest itself paradoxically decreased public 
awareness for that group, a necessary ingredient for favorable public attitudes on who belongs 
within the national ingroup. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
This thesis has asked the central question of what drives public perceptions of national 
identity. Canada, Australia, the United States, and New Zealand share many broad similarities 
which allow for isolation of differences to explain observed variation in national identity 
construction. The four countries share a comparable demographic history which in each case 
includes an indigenous population, British settlers, and substantial, multi-ethnic immigration. 
Additionally, they are also analogous in cultural values, economic structures, and development 
levels. While this would suggest similarities in public perceptions of belonging in these 
countries, the four nations differ on the extent to which their national label is given to people of 
varying ethnic origins. Chapter three found clear differences in how racially-exclusive 
‘American’ is compared with ‘Canadian,’ ‘New Zealander,’ and ‘Australian.’ Public opinion 
data analyses revealed that the American label was the most racially-inclusive national identity 
while ‘Australian’ was the least. These results pointed to the fundamental question of whether 
national identity is fixed or malleable: the analyzed variables compared institutional and 
behavioral explanations, leading to the conclusion that public perceptions of national identity can 
change as human behavior compels it to do so. 
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Figure 14. Scale of National Ethnocentrism compared with scales of independent variables 
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Institutionalism versus behavioralism: what explains variation in national identity? 
 
Figure 15. Ethnic activism as the strongest predictor of varying national identity construction 
 
 
 
The variation seen in the Scale of Ethnocentrism can best be explained with the 
behavioral independent variable — ethnic activism. The other two variables are incompatible 
with the ranking of the countries’ racialization of national identities. Although immigration 
policy can control inflows of migrants and might therefore impact conceptions of the nation, a 
more restrictive immigration policy did not clearly point to a more racialized national identity. 
Additionally, the policies of the four countries were broadly close enough to result in similar 
demographic shifts — populations in each of the countries grew increasingly more multiethnic in 
the latter half of the twentieth century. If immigration policy and the demographic shifts that 
resulted were a key explanation of the racialization of national identity, it would be expected that 
the countries’ national identities would all evolve together to embrace minorities as the 
population of non-white members increased. This has not been the case, with the greatest point 
of contrast between the American and Australian identities. Therefore, even if restricting 
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immigration contributed to racially-exclusive national identities, the United States and Canada 
were able to overcome the exclusivity, indicating that other variables were at play. Like 
immigration policy, legislating for multiculturalism is a governmental channel which can craft 
the national narrative on inclusion and exclusion. Unlike immigration policy, though, 
institutional multiculturalism is explicitly targeted at promoting racial diversity and inclusion, 
directly affecting racial minorities already in the country. Additionally, it is possible for a 
government to uphold federal-level multicultural policy while implementing restrictive 
immigration policy. Multiculturalism theory posits that these policies lead to higher acceptance 
of outgroups,222 while social identity theorists believe that these policies lead to social 
categorization and ingroup protective behaviors.223 This thesis did not find that multiculturalism 
policy was linked to more inclusion for non-white members of the nation. Although the opposite 
was not proven either, it is a surprising result that Australia had implemented high levels of 
federal-level support for multiculturalism, yet had the most racialized national identity, while the 
United States had the most inclusive national identity without any federal promotion of 
multiculturalism. Both measures of institutional multiculturalism analyzed (policy affirmations 
and government programs) displayed the same clear hierarchy, placing the governments of 
Canada and Australia as the most supportive of the multiculturalism project, followed by New 
Zealand and the United States. Hence, even if multiculturalism policy did contribute to a 
racially-inclusive national identity, it is apparent that another variable was a stronger 
determinant, able to overcome any effects of multiculturalism policy. For example, whether or 
not multiculturalism policy had a net positive effect in Australia, it was certainly not positive 
 
222 Lambert and Taylor, Coping with Cultural and Racial Diversity in Urban America quoted in; Verkuyten, “Ethnic 
Group Identification and Group Evaluation Among Minority and Majority Groups,” 134. 
223 Dovidio, Kawakami, and Gaertner, “Reducing Contemporary Prejudice” quoted in; Verkuyten, “Ethnic Group 
Identification and Group Evaluation Among Minority and Majority Groups,” 134. 
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enough to overcome whichever variable drove the United States to embrace a more racially-
accepting national identity. 
The institutional variables could not sufficiently explain shifts in public opinion in this 
investigation. A behavioral explanation for the racialization of national identity, ethnic 
activism’s effects aptly explain how each country has embraced minorities in its national 
ingroup. Literature has found that protests have impacted policy development and public opinion 
in a variety of issue areas. This thesis found activism’s ability to shift public opinion in the area 
of national identity. The United States experienced high levels of activism, with specific goals of 
cultural awakening, embracing ethnic identity, and gaining awareness of ethnic experiences. The 
Asian American movement is one example of ethnic activism centered specifically around 
identity concerns. In contrast, Canada’s movements focused more on achieving legislative goals 
rather than employing aggressive tactics to gain public attention. This key difference between the 
two North American countries’ histories reveals that activism which gains public recognition is  
the key to influencing public opinion. This substantiates public opinion researchers’ findings — 
in the context of the civil rights movement, Lee (2002) challenges the well-documented elite 
opinion theories that argue exclusively for top-down influence, instead finding that public views 
on race are altered and transformed through non-elites in social movements.224 New Zealand’s 
Māori movements worked to the detriment of multiculturalism as it highlighted the country’s 
bicultural attitudes, but it also proved that the New Zealand identity was less ‘white-exclusive,’ 
conforming to previous research finding the country to be ‘white-and-Māori-exclusive.’225 New 
Zealand’s national identity ranks as less racially-exclusive than Australia’s not because it 
 
224 Lee, Mobilizing Public Opinion. 
225 Sibley and Liu, “New Zealand = Bicultural?” 
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embraces multiracialism, but because it embraces biracialism. Australia’s lack of ethnic activism 
agrees with its racialized national identity.  
The United States had the least amount of institutional policies targeted at promoting 
multiculturalism, whereas the other three countries had the least protest movements. This finding 
could indicate a responsiveness from the parliaments of the three countries to ethnic demands, 
eradicating the need for protest. However, these top-down policies paradoxically raised less 
public awareness of minorities’ struggles, which this thesis argues is the key to shifting public 
attitudes on their belonging. Although it could be argued that multiculturalism policy should also 
create public recognition for minorities’ struggles, the results of this thesis demonstrate that the 
presence of multiculturalism policy is not consistent with public recognition of minority 
experiences nor the relative racialization levels. It is a counterintuitive and surprising result that 
countries with these tailored policies do not show more inclusivity, but it remains consistent with 
Lee’s (2002) research arguing that in some cases, bottom-up initiatives are more effective than 
top-down.226 Although some research has been conducted on the effects of multiculturalism 
policy, this paradox represents an avenue for future exploration. 
 
Institutionalism versus behavioralism: Is public opinion fixed or malleable? 
While the results of this thesis focus on drivers of national identity, they contribute to the 
literature on public opinion change more generally. Scholarship on the connection between 
institutions, or law, and social change is extensive. On one side of the debate, researchers have 
shown that law can consolidate and influence cultural change as it does not “only codify existing 
customs, morals, or mores, but also… modify the behavior and values presently existing in a 
 
226 Lee, Mobilizing Public Opinion. 
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particular society.”227 U.S. Supreme Court decisions have been found to influence public 
opinion, although this is conditional on factors such as the salience of the issue, the political 
context, as well as individual-level characteristics.228 On the other side of the debate, many 
researchers have argued for the limited power of institutions and legislation to influence public 
attitudes. As an example, Anleu (2010) argues that in the case of the women’s movement, “it is 
naive to assume that simply reforming statutes will directly transform discriminatory social 
practices and enduring attitudes towards women.”229 Literature supporting the effects of social 
movements on public opinion has been documented in chapter six, and generally points to the 
effectiveness of activism for motivating attitude shifts, for example in the civil rights movement 
and on the issue of LGBT rights.230 Through the case study of national identity, the results of this 
thesis lend support to the argument that legislation is limited in its scope to change public 
opinion, while social movements can influence public attitudes through changing the public 
consciousness. Ultimately, this thesis advances the view that public opinion is malleable. 
 
Implications 
Globalization has led to a new generation of non-white natives in white-majority societies 
for whom the boundaries of belonging and acceptance are blurry. These immigrants and their 
descendants are often relegated to an identity that is not their own and frequently struggle to 
define their national, cultural and racial identities in the context of their heterogeneous 
 
227 William M. Evan, “Law as an Instrument of Social Change,” in Applied Sociology: Opportunities and Problems, 
ed. Alvin W. Gouldner and S. M. Miller (New York: Free Press, 1965), 286 quoted in; Lim, “A Multicultural Act 
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(September 1, 2006): 419–33, https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290605900310. 
229 Sharyn L. Roach Anleu, Law and Social Change, 2nd ed (Thousand Oaks [Calif.]: Sage Publications, 2010). 
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environments. This experience has received little attention in the mainstream, despite its 
ubiquitous effects spanning multiple continents. 
One important implication of these findings are the negative psychological consequences 
of decreased belonging for non-white members of national communities, extensively 
documented in psychology literature. A pervading societal attitude that racial minorities are 
foreigners instead of valid members of the national ingroup leads to a contemporary form of 
racism called racial microaggression, which manifests as pervasive, automatic, and daily 
interactions that are often dismissed as benign and innocent but convey strong messages of 
inferiority and exclusion.231 Although these messages appear minor and innocuous, it has been 
proposed that these daily experiences can have more influence on racial anger, frustration and 
self-esteem than more overt forms of racism.232 Targets of racial microaggression have reported 
experiencing stress, anxiety, helplessness, academic disengagement, anger, and frustration.233 
Additionally, the ‘perpetual foreigner’ stereotype has significantly predicted lower hope and life 
satisfaction for Asian Americans and depression for Latino Americans.234 Identity denial also 
leads to negative physical health consequences — Albuja et al.’s (2019) experiment showed 
slower cortisol recovery among bicultural participants who were denied their American identity 
compared with participants under identity-irrelevant conditions.235 Furthermore, and crucially, 
 
231 Derald Wing Sue et al., “Racial Microaggressions in Everyday Life: Implications for Clinical Practice,” 
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the invisible nature of this type of racism prevents perpetrators from realizing their complicity in 
creating psychological issues and disparities in employment, health care, and education for 
minorities.236 
Another important implication of these findings lies in the consequences for nationhood 
and civic engagement. National attachment research has shown white Americans displaying the 
greatest level of patriotism and nationalism compared with Asian Americans, Latino Americans, 
and African Americans.237 In the United States, the ‘perpetual foreigner’ stereotype was found to 
be a significant predictor of identity conflict and a lower sense of belonging to American culture 
among ethnic minorities.238 The perception that racial minorities are foreign and the resulting 
decreased sense of national belonging among non-whites can lead to dangerous outcomes for a 
representative democracy which encourages civic participation among all groups. Consistent 
with the relative racialization of their national identities, the four case countries diverge on ethnic 
representation in government. The United States has the highest proportion of racial minorities in 
its legislature, at 22% of members of Congress (nevertheless short of its 39% non-white 
population) in 2018.239 In 2015, in Canada’s most diverse parliament, visible minorities 
consisted of 14% of the legislature, and 19% of the population.240 The New Zealand Parliament 
had even less minority representation, with only 10% of members identifying as Pacific or Asian, 
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despite these two groups making up 19% of the population.241 Māori made up 15% of the 
population but 22% of Parliament, attesting to the civic effects of strong feelings of belonging in 
a country. Australia paints the most dire picture of the consequences of exclusion of ethnic 
minorities. While 24% of Australians are non-white, non-white Australians made up only 6% of 
Parliament in 2018, with 94% of legislators having Anglo-Celtic or European heritage.242 These 
rates of ethnic minorities running for and being elected to office send a stark reminder of the 
need to readjust national narratives to include all groups. 
While the individual and societal consequences of minority exclusion are grim, the 
results of this thesis highlight an important strand of optimism. Change is possible when it comes 
to who is seen to belong. Ethnic activism is a useful tool for minorities to assert themselves into 
the national consciousness, gaining recognition for their rightful place as legitimate and full 
members of the national community. While this investigation in no way argues that the United 
States’ national identity is perfectly inclusive, it does highlight one area in which its history of 
racial mobilization contributed to less exclusion of minorities. Importantly, the success of its 
social movements represent an example the other three countries in the studies (especially New 
Zealand and Australia) can emulate. Indeed, the consequences of these results transcend the four 
countries explored here — the need for, and positive effects of, minority activism is a universal 
lesson that can be applied to all immigrant-receiving nations. 
Future avenues of research include further investigation into the link between national 
identity and civic engagement as well as specific causal mechanisms within social movements 
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that promote inclusive national identities. In particular, policymakers would find useful an 
investigation on whether top-down approaches are wholly ineffective in fostering inclusiveness 
compared with bottom-up approaches, or whether there are in fact different policy pathways 
besides existing forms of multiculturalism policy that can help inclusion efforts. For now, the 
message presented by this research is clear: while everyone belonging to a national community 
should be granted its national label, minorities must demand it. 
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